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Structural Constitutionalism as 
Counterterrorism 
Aziz Z. Huq∗ 
During the past decade, federal courts have adjudicated 
proliferating challenges to novel policy responses to terrorism. 
Judges often resolve the individual rights and statutory interpretation 
questions implicated in those controversies by deploying 
presumptions or rules of thumb derived from the Constitution’s 
Separation of Powers. These “structural constitutional 
presumptions” serve as heuristics to facilitate adjudication and to 
enable judicial bypass of difficult legal, policy, and factual questions. 
This Article challenges the use of such structural presumptions in 
counterterrorism cases. Drawing upon recent empirical research in 
political science, political psychology, and security studies, it 
demonstrates that abstract eighteenth-century Separation of Powers 
ideals do not translate into robust and empirically defensible 
generalizations for twenty-first-century security decisions. Structural 
constitutionalism thus cannot serve as a foundation for heuristics or 
shortcuts in the judicial consideration of new security measures. To 
the extent courts properly pass on the legality of counterterrorism 
policies, judges should rely instead on the ordinary tools of doctrine, 
statutory construction, and fact finding. The ensuing jurisprudence of 
counterterrorism would look much more like ordinary public law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a terrorist organization that exploits Twitter and similar social 
networking services to disseminate false rumors of impending airborne toxic 
events in major American cities. To prevent harmful public panic, the federal 
government shuts down the services without notice, seizes all traffic data, and 
installs contemporaneous monitoring of the network to capture the localities 
and identities of all future users.1 How should a judge analyze the inevitable 
constitutional challenge lodged in a federal court? Of course, this would hardly 
be the first time a post-9/11 counterterrorism policy had been challenged in 
court. In the past decade, the federal government has adopted new measures on 
1. For a pithy introduction to the problem of web-based terrorism, see RICHARD A. CLARKE & 
ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 69–102 (2010). Tight government control of instant messaging services has been one 
proposed response to the August 2011 London riots. See Eric Westervelt, British PM Cameron 
Proposes Tactics to Quell Riots, NPR (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/11/139558719/ 
british-pm-cameron-proposes-tactics-to-quell-violence. 
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electronic surveillance, military detention, war-crime trials, targeted killing, 
and border searches—and in so doing catalyzed a wave of judicial challenges.2 
Our judge, confronted by the hypothetical regulation of social networking, 
would thus have ample post-9/11 case law to mine for signposts about how to 
deal with her legal question. 
She would find a jurisprudence that spoke softly to the empirics of 
security policy,3 but that contained multitudes of examples, precedents, and 
reflections about the proper distribution of authority between branches of the 
national government.4 Courts, she would discover, routinely resolve the 
statutory construction and individual rights questions implicated in those cases 
by applying heuristics or rules of thumb drawn from the Separation of Powers.5 
That is, she would come across judges often (albeit not always) asking whether 
a policy conforms to guidelines derived from what might be termed the logic of 
“structural constitutionalism” instead of engaging directly with the 
complexities of statutory interpretation or empirical fact finding.6 Using 
structural constitutional presumptions, she would find judges frequently engage 
in a second-order inquiry about how a policy came to be instead of asking the 
first-order question how a policy works on the ground.7 She would find 
conservative judges tending to ask whether the executive has endorsed a policy, 
and liberal judges tending to search for congressional blessing before allowing 
a controversial decision to go forward. By looking at the second-order question 
of a policy’s origin rather than the first-order merits of the policy, liberal and 
conservative judges alike have sought to leverage the insights of the structural 
design of our 1787 Constitution. At the same time, they aim to avoid delving 
too deeply into difficult empirical and policy questions raised by new 
technologies and rapidly evolving security threats. 
The extent of judicial reliance upon a logic of Separation of Powers as a 
crutch for the adjudication of counterterrorism cases is unparalleled in other 
2. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 5. 
3. I use the term “national security policy” here interchangeably with “counterterrorism policy” 
to refer solely to policies adopted in response to transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. My 
argument does not extend to the larger realm of foreign relations law.  
4. See infra Part I (surveying cases). 
5. Every major Supreme Court case about a post-9/11 counterterrorism policy has used 
Separation of Powers theory in this way. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) 
(extending constitutional habeas jurisdiction to Guantánamo Bay detentions); Munaf v. Geren, 553 
U.S. 674 (2008) (upholding executive discretion to dispose of U.S. citizen detainees seized in Iraq by 
transfer to another sovereign); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (invalidating first-generation 
military commissions); Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (upholding U.S. citizen’s right of 
judicial review of grounds for military detention); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (extending 
statutory habeas jurisdiction to Guantánamo Bay detentions).  
6. I use the term “structural constitutionalism” in this Article to refer exclusively to inferences 
drawn from the Separation of Powers. I do not address federalism questions.  
7. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 809, 811 (2007) (explaining the difference between second-order and first-order 
analysis). 
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policy domains. To be sure, inferences premised on the Separation of Powers 
do enter into policy areas as diverse as environmental law, financial regulatory 
jurisprudence, and immigration. But the case law in those areas is not typically 
characterized by insistent reliance upon structural constitutional presumptions.8 
The function that structural constitutional presumptions play in the 
counterterrorism domain is thus distinctive and perhaps unique. It therefore 
warrants isolation and close analysis. 
Undertaking that task, this Article challenges judges’ use of structural 
constitutional presumptions in counterterrorism cases. Its core claim is that 
judicial employment of presumptions grounded in abstract and idealized 
accounts of the Constitution’s Separation of Powers is unwise. The 
presumptions upon which both liberal and conservative judges tend to rely are 
empirically unsound. A large gap exists between the ideal-type branches 
imagined in eighteenth-century structural constitutional theory and observable 
realities on the twenty-first-century ground. As a result, abstract structural 
constitutional theories frequently provide no useful information as to whether a 
counterterrorism policy is appropriately tailored, justified by a compelling 
governmental need, or consistent with a statute’s command. Courts should 
therefore abandon structural constitutional presumptions. Instead, I argue, they 
should grapple directly with legal and factual puzzles implicated in novel 
counterterrorism initiatives using ordinary tools of legal interpretation and fact 
finding. There is no reason to believe this would generate more erroneous 
results than the current approach. 
At the threshold, I should emphasize that this claim is modest along 
several dimensions. First, my argument does not concern the appropriate scope 
of judicial review in counterterrorism cases. I thus make no claim about what 
class of disputes in this policy area should be amenable to resolution in an 
Article III forum consistent with standing and political question doctrines. 
Second, my claim is also limited to judicial consideration of counterterrorism 
policies. I do not deny that the Separation of Powers might play a role in 
litigation related to, say, foreign affairs or environmental matters quite apart 
from their direct application as constitutional rules of decision.9 As a 
 8. Another area in which such presumptions also play a role, albeit not one addressed in this 
Article, is foreign affairs law.  
 9. Hence, I do not deny that structural constitutionalism has many doctrinal applications that 
are simply orthogonal to the arguments developed in this Article. For example, Separation of Powers 
principles are deployed to reach judgments about the consistency of governance arrangements with the 
text of Articles I and II. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438–47 (1998) (invalidating 
line-item veto); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732−34 (1986) (invalidating direct congressional 
control of spending); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951–59 (1983) (invalidating one-house legislative 
veto). This Article does not address these direct applications of the Separation of Powers.  
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consequence, I bracket the question whether the arguments developed here 
would have force elsewhere in respect to other policy questions.10 
Third, my claim is limited to judicial consideration of counterterrorism 
policies. Many of the arguments and much of the empirical evidence developed 
below may well bite on the question of how an institutional designer might go 
about allocating national security-related responsibilities between or within the 
political branches. My argument here, though, concerns only the modalities 
employed by federal judges in the resolution of cases and controversies.11 I do 
not claim that courts should engage in the first-order design of counterterrorism 
policy, as it is clear that the political branches have been and will continue to be 
first movers in this domain. I simply posit that the ex post review that now 
occurs through constitutional and statutory challenges should be conducted in a 
different way. 
Fourth, the arguments developed in this Article are consequentialist and 
pragmatic. Thus, they do not address judges’ and scholars’ reliance on 
historical, originalist grounds for employing structural constitutional 
presumptions. Working in that pragmatic vein, I assume that the goal of policy 
making in the counterterrorism domain is to maximize some rough measure of 
social welfare. I make no strong claims about the appropriate social welfare 
function. For my purposes, it suffices to say that there is general accord that 
counterterrorism policies should minimize both the quantum of harm from 
terrorists’ actions and also the scale of intrusions upon individuals’ 
constitutionally defined liberty interests, and do so at the least feasible cost.12 
That roughly welfarist goal, I argue, is best achieved when federal courts 
abjure structural constitutional presumptions in favor of the ordinary processes 
of fact finding and legal reasoning. 
To make that core claim more lucid, it may be helpful to sketch quickly 
how structural constitutional presumptions tend to be employed as heuristics in 
10. I suspect that the arguments from institutional capacity developed in Part II have broad 
echoes in nonsecurity contexts, while the arguments from political environments in Part III have a 
narrower compass. 
11. The modesty of this claim should not be overblown. There is an enormous body of 
literature on how judges resolve constitutional and statutory cases because these are consequential 
subjects given the role that judicial review has come to have in our system of government. Cf. Aziz Z. 
Huq, When Was Judicial Restraint?, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 579 (2012) (developing a historical account 
of the growth of judicial willingness to invalidate statutes and regulations on constitutional grounds). 
There is a separate set of questions concerning the institutional design of counterterrorism policies that 
warrant separate consideration. Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE L.J. 
1415 (2012) (examining one such design question: the allocation of adjudicative responsibilities 
among different possible venues in the terrorism context).  
12. It is worth noting that I also do not take the position that comparative institutional analysis 
of all stripes is fruitless. To the contrary, I believe much progress can be made by thinking about 
institutional design questions. My concern here is the employment of structural constitutional 
presumptions derived from eighteenth-century political theory, which strike me as far too coarse and 
inaccurate to be effective in that way. 
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counterterrorism cases.13 Judges are often called upon to consider whether a 
specific policy conforms to a statutory rule or one of the Constitution’s 
individual rights guarantees. In so doing, they can draw upon one of two 
presumptions grounded in the Founding-era theory of the Separation of Powers. 
First, some judges value executive primacy in counterterrorism matters on 
comparative institutional competence grounds.14 They presume the executive 
should have broad, perhaps exclusive, prerogative to craft counterterrorism 
policy in light of its epistemic and functional advantages over Congress and the 
courts. On this account, any counterterrorism action with the executive’s 
blessing is likely to be treated as constitutional, and hence not amenable to 
second-guessing by federal judges. In practice, this view tends to cash out as 
broad endorsement of most or all security-related government action. Second, 
other judges believe that congressional involvement is the sine qua non of 
lawful, effective action against terrorism. These judges fear that the executive 
is subject to pervasive cognitive distortions, such that the participation of both 
political branches is necessary to leverage the nation’s full stock of political 
wisdom. They therefore find security policies valid only if Congress has given 
a clear seal of approval. This position results in occasional invalidations of 
policies based on the manner in which they were adopted. 
The “pro-executive” analysis and the “pro-Congress” approach have more 
in common than is first apparent. Both draw inferences from eighteenth-century 
Separation of Powers theory in the abstract in order to resolve concrete 
controversies. And both assume a federal court is more likely to reach the 
correct answer to a legal question if it looks at the arc of a policy’s enactment 
rather than directly at whether a policy conforms to binding legal rules.15 
This Article develops two reasons for skepticism about the deployment of 
structural constitutional presumptions in counterterrorism cases. Both 
arguments target the empirical foundations of such presumptions. In tandem 
they suggest the Separation of Powers model does not provide a reliable source 
of heuristics for counterterrorism cases. 
13. Part I provides more extended examples beyond this terse exemplar.  
14. For a crisp explanation of institutional competence arguments in general, see Cass R. 
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886, 925–48 
(2003). 
15. The same structural arguments are found in national security cases debating the appropriate 
measure of deference to executive judgments on statutory meaning. Hence, there is a parallel debate in 
the literature on statutory interpretation about the proper quantum of deference to executive 
interpretations of statutes in the national security domain. Compare Deborah N. Pearlstein, After 
Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 851 
(2011) (“[C]ategorical deference is not formally required (as a matter of executive power) and may be 
formally prohibited (as a matter of judicial power).”), with Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1204 (2007) (arguing that the executive is 
best placed to resolve difficult foreign affairs questions requiring judgments of policy and principle, 
and that the judiciary should defer to the executive based on its foreign policy expertise). 
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The first ground for skepticism of the Separation of Powers presumptions 
starts with the observation that such heuristics take no account of the internal 
ecology of each branch. Such presumptions typically assume the branches can 
be analyzed as functionally indivisible units. The political branches, however, 
contain complex internal ecologies of committees, agencies, and bureaucratic 
rivalries. This internal variety means that an executive often labeled “unitary” 
turns out on closer inspection to be at war with itself. Similarly, as a result of its 
own internal fragmentation, Congress is much less likely to engage in 
deliberation than its advocates suggest. Historical and political science research 
suggests that these problems are especially acute in the counterterrorism 
domain. Attention to the internal ecology of the branches casts doubt on the 
stable institutional characteristics ascribed by the Separation of Powers to the 
political branches (e.g., efficiency and deliberation). Bringing into focus the 
internal ecology of the branches also underscores the high variance in the 
quality of both branches’ performance. In so doing, it undermines claims of 
comparative institutional competence lodged on behalf of the executive or 
Congress. 
The second ground for skepticism of structural constitutional 
presumptions is that the canonical Separation of Powers logic used by judges in 
counterterrorism jurisprudence ignores the external political environment that 
surrounds and buffets the elected branches. Yet it is a matter of common 
notoriety that both political branches are strongly influenced by the external 
ecosystem of constituency pressures, strategic interest group action, and 
exogenous political shocks. Judges and commentators on counterterrorism 
jurisprudence tend to bracket these forces. I claim this is a mistake. Recent 
political science and empirical social psychology work on government and 
public responses to terrorism suggests that such external influences strongly 
and consistently press toward outcomes that are distant from optimal policy 
choices.16 If both political branches are equally vulnerable to such distorting 
external influences, it is hard to see why a judge would have cause to prefer one 
over the other. 
These two arguments cast doubt on the reliability of the Separation of 
Powers as a source of heuristics for determining the conformity of new 
counterterrorism policies with statutory commands or individual rights 
guarantees. Rather than repairing to structural presumptions, I argue, courts 
should employ the ordinary tools of constitutional adjudication, statutory 
interpretation, and fact-finding to decide cases. This does not mean courts 
should displace the political branches in crafting threshold policy frameworks 
and institutions. It is simply to posit that courts should judge such frameworks 
on the merits, not on the back of ill-founded structural presumptions, within the 
framework of an otherwise properly justiciable case. Further, there is no reason 
16. See infra Part III.  
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to believe that the exercise of courts’ independent judgment—always and 
necessarily informed by the empirical record created by the legislature and the 
government—will yield incorrect answers more often than application of 
systemically flawed structural constitutional presumptions. Judges, after all, 
benefit from a relative insulation from the distortive influences upon the 
political branches. In consequence, their independent judgment about the fit 
between a government decision and the law may be particularly telling. 
Part I of the Article illustrates how the Separation of Powers has been 
used in recent judicial precedent as a heuristic for resolving the legality of new 
counterterrorism measures. Parts II and III develop the two complementary 
critiques of structural constitutional presumptions. Part II explores the internal 
ecology of the political branches. It argues that the stable characteristics 
assigned to each branch by structural constitutional presumptions are illusory. 
Part III then turns to the external political ecology of the political branches. It 
contends that external democratic pressures constrain both branches in ways 
that distort outcomes beyond the salvific reach of the Separation of Powers. 
The Article responds to these critiques in Part IV by explaining how judges can 
and should address legal challenges to new counterterrorism policies without 
employing presumptions grounded in structural constitutionalism. 
I. 
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AS COUNTERTERRORISM 
The jurisprudence of American counterterrorism can, with but a touch of 
caricature, be labeled an exercise in as-applied structural constitutionalism. A 
decade after the 9/11 attacks, counterterrorism casebooks begin with the 
division of constitutional authority between Congress and the President.17 
Constitutional law casebooks situate counterterrorism precedent in the 
Separation of Powers chapter.18 Scholars routinely frame counterterrorism as a 
“choice between promulgating anti-terrorism measures through the executive 
branch [or] . . . through the legislative branch.”19 The link between national 
security and structural constitutionalism is so embedded in the legal 
consciousness now it hardly needs explication or defense. 
17. See, e.g., STEPHEN DYCAS ET AL., COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 39–63 (2007) (discussing 
division of war powers between the political branches).  
18. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 381–92 (6th ed. 2009) 
(discussing terrorism detention cases in the course of addressing the Separation of Powers); RONALD 
D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES 299–323 (8th ed. 2007) (same).  
19. Daphne Barak-Erez, Terrorism Law Between the Executive and Legislative Models, 57 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 877, 877 (2009); accord Laurie R. Blank, Principles of Counter-Terrorism Law, 25 
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 771, 772 (2011) (book review); see also Patricia L. Bellia, Designing 
Surveillance Law, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 329 (2011) (“Institutional competence arguments about 
communications surveillance law tend to focus on the choice between legislative and judicial controls 
on executive action . . . .”).  
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This Part outlines two specific ways in which courts have drawn on the 
deep reservoir of Founding-era ideas about the Separation of Powers to craft 
heuristics that lower decision costs in challenges to counterterrorism policies. 
First, Separation of Powers arguments have been invoked to support executive 
exclusivity based on the functional advantages of the presidency. Second, there 
are arguments for necessary congressional involvement. These hold that 
optimal results are attained when both branches speak in accord. Conservatives 
tend to favor the first line of cases, and liberals the second. Despite their 
different normative and political valences, both arguments make two key 
assumptions: (1) that the branch is the fundamental level of analysis and (2) 
that both the political branches have durable characteristics that enable 
comparative institutional judgments. One aim of this Article is to show that 
those shared assumptions are fragile and cannot bear the weight they are 
routinely asked to sustain. 
A. Separation of Powers Arguments for Executive Primacy 
The first presumption derived from the Separation of Powers turns on the 
executive’s assumed comparative advantage in national security matters. This 
argument for executive primacy is rooted in the textual allocation of “the” 
executive power in the President and the concomitant authorizations of the 
“Take Care” Clause and the “Commander in Chief” Clause.20 It further finds 
support in Founding-era writings of Alexander Hamilton, an early advocate of 
broad executive prerogatives.21 In the Federalist No. 70, Hamilton famously 
emphasized the capacity of the President to act with “[d]ecision, activity, 
secrecy, and dispatch.”22 Modern commentators amplify the Hamiltonian 
20. Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution makes the President the “Commander in Chief of 
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual Service of the United States,” while Section 3 stipulates that the President “shall take care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 
670 (1862) (“Whether the President in fulfilling his duties as Commander in-chief” had met with a 
situation justifying treating the southern States as belligerents and instituting a blockade was a question 
“to be decided by him” and which the Court could not question, but must leave to “the political 
department of the Government to which this power was entrusted.”).  
21. Hamilton had been among the pro-executive party even at Philadelphia. See JACK N. 
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 255 
(1996). 
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
Elsewhere in the Federalist Papers, however, Hamilton expresses more reservations about executive 
discretion. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 425–26 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
1987) (“[I]t would be utterly unsafe and improper to intrust [the sole power of treaty-making] to an 
elective magistrate of four years’ duration . . . . The history of human conduct does not warrant that 
exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so 
delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the 
sole disposal of [the President].”). In his 1793–1794 debate with Madison about President 
Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation, Hamilton again emphasized his endorsement of a “broad and 
comprehensive” set of executive authorities. See THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794: 
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position by underscoring the functional advantages of the presidency over the 
legislature in matters of security.23 They assert that the executive has “critical 
advantages over a multi-member legislature in reaching foreign policy and 
national security decisions.”24 To exploit these advantages, “the executive 
branch needs the flexibility to act quickly, possibly in situations where 
congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act on the intelligence.”25 
There was robust support for the pro-executive position in Supreme Court 
precedent even before the 9/11 attacks. In the foreign affairs domain, for 
example, Justice Sutherland’s 1936 opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
licensed presidential actions that would be unconstitutional in the domestic 
sphere.26 In matters of military discipline, the Court typically evinces large 
deference to the government.27 And when the executive has raised concerns 
about sensitive or classified material, the Court has almost always accepted 
those concerns without searching investigation.28 
TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 16 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007) 
[hereinafter PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES]. 
23. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, 
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007). 
24. Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512, 
2523 (2006). 
25. John Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV. 793, 
820 (2004); see also JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON 
TERROR 120 (2008) (“If ever there were an emergency that Congress could not prepare for, it was the 
war brought upon us on 9/11.”); JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION 
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005). To the extent that Professor Yoo’s arguments rely on 
historical claims, other scholars have persuasively and comprehensively shown them to be belied by 
the historical record and indeed at odds with elementary standards of legal historical work. See Julian 
Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and the Discipline of History, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 377, 381–82 
(2011) (“Yoo’s constitutional history . . . misstates crucial facts, misunderstands important episodes, 
and misrepresents central primary sources . . . [and] omits and obscures evidence that contradicts its 
claims.”). 
26. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322–24 (1936) (authorizing 
broader delegations in foreign affairs than in domestic matters). The Curtiss-Wright case was the nub 
of early and devastating criticism. See David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis 
of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 478–90 (1946). But it still has force among the 
Justices. A unanimous Court, for example, recently confirmed the President’s free-standing authority 
to “waive” or “suspend” provisions of law in the foreign affairs domain. See Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 
129 S. Ct. 2183, 2189 (2009) (“[T]he notion of the President’s suspending the operation of a valid 
law . . . is well established, at least in the sphere of foreign affairs.”); see also Winter v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24–25 (2008) (evincing similar deference).  
27. For cases involving fundamental rights see Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 
(1986) (rejecting religious liberty claim); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (holding that 
challenge to National Guard actions presented nonjusticiable political question); see also Rostker v. 
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1981) (noting that “perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded 
Congress greater deference” than in military affairs).  
28. See Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (declining to review “[p]redictive 
judgment[s]” concerning classified information made by the Navy in the course of employment 
decisions); CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 169–73 (1985) (showing similar deference to the judgment of 
the political branches on secrecy and classification issues). For an unusual and interesting 
counterexample involving the government’s effort to present evidence in an espionage case without 
disclosures to the public, see United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 703, 716–17 (E.D. Va. 2007).  
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The Court also approaches executive counterterrorism initiatives in a 
deferential spirit. Indeed, even when the Court rejects a security-related claim, 
it goes out of its way to underscore the continuing priority of plausible security 
concerns.29 
Two recent cases illustrate the Separation of Powers’ roots of current 
judicial deference to executive judgments. The first is the Court’s 2010 
judgment on the material support law that has been used extensively for 
criminal interdiction of suspected terrorists in the United States.30 Chief Justice 
Roberts’s majority opinion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) 
focused in part on the construction of the material support statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B, and so is not strictly speaking directly about the scope of executive 
authority. But its First Amendment analysis pivoted quite clearly on a structural 
presumption rooted in notions of executive branch competence on security 
matters.31 
First Amendment claims are typically adjudicated with close attention to 
particular facts.32 Confronted by the government’s argument in HLP that 
intermediate scrutiny should be applied, the Court first held that it would use a 
more “demanding” standard to review the material support law.33 But Chief 
Justice Roberts did not engage in a particularized inquiry about the speech at 
issue or the likely consequences of the statute on the universe of possible future 
speech. He focused instead on the abstract question of the executive’s 
institutional capacity in national security matters.34 Chief Justice Roberts 
29. For example, in the path-breaking case of Boumediene, in which the Court extended the 
Suspension Clause to protect alien detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Justice Kennedy underscored that 
“[o]ur opinion does not undermine the Executive’s powers as Commander in Chief.” Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008). Similarly, in Hamdi, Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion cautioned 
that the “Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking belong in the hands of those 
who are best positioned and most politically accountable for making them.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507, 531 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
30. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (upholding 18 
U.S.C. § 2399B(a)(1), which makes it a crime to “knowingly provid[e] material support or resources to 
a foreign terrorist organization,” against First Amendment challenge); see also Aziz Z. Huq, 
Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 16 (2012) 
(analyzing HLP in the larger context of the Roberts Court approach to political speech). On the use of 
material support offenses, see generally CTR. ON LAW & SEC., TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001–SEPTEMBER 11, 2010 (2010), available at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/ 
Portals/0/documents/01_TTRC2010Final1.pdf. 
31. See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2727–30. 
32. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984) (requiring 
appellate courts hearing speech cases to conduct an independent review of the facts); Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958) (“[T]he procedures by which the facts of the case are determined 
assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law . . . .”). 
33. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2724. At least one court of appeals has since construed HLP to apply 
strict scrutiny. See Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 660 F.3d 1019, 1049 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
34. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2727. 
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emphasized “the lack of competence on the part of the courts” and categorically 
committed the “evaluation of the facts [to] the Executive”35: 
One reason for . . . respect is that national security and foreign policy 
concerns arise in connection with efforts to confront evolving threats 
in an area where information can be difficult to obtain and the impact 
of certain conduct difficult to assess . . . . In this context, conclusions 
must often be based on informed judgment rather than concrete 
evidence, and that reality affects what we may reasonably insist on 
from the Government . . . . The Government, when seeking to prevent 
imminent harms in the context of international affairs and national 
security, is not required to conclusively link all the pieces in the puzzle 
before we grant weight to its empirical conclusions.36 
Applying that presumption of executive competence, Chief Justice Roberts 
transformed what he had initially framed as an exercise in strict scrutiny into a 
gesture of broad and uninflected deference. A presumption drawn from an 
idealized account of structural constitutionalism in HLP thus lightened judicial 
scrutiny of a policy that otherwise would have triggered possibly fatal First 
Amendment strict scrutiny.37 
Second, in the 2008 case Munaf v. Geren, the Court considered the habeas 
petitions of two American citizens detained by coalition forces in Iraq.38 The 
Court held that although it had jurisdiction over the petitions, it would decline 
to issue relief on “equitable” grounds.39 Addressing petitioners’ concerns about 
the risk of torture upon transfer to Iraqi custody, the Court repaired to a 
Hamiltonian logic of institutional competence: “The Judiciary is not suited to 
second-guess such determinations—determinations that would require federal 
courts to pass judgment on foreign justice systems and undermine the 
Government’s ability to speak with one voice in this area.”40 There was no need 
for judicial supervision, the Court added, since the executive could be trusted 
not to transfer a U.S. citizen to possible abuse. The Court’s argument on this 
score did not rest on empirical evidence about conditions and detainee 
treatment in Iraqi prisons.41 It instead relied on a Separation of Powers 
35. Id.  
36. Id. at 2727–28. 
37. Strict scrutiny is not always fatal in fact. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in 
Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 796–97 
(2006) (finding, based on survey of cases, about one in three laws survive strict scrutiny challenges, 
but survival rate varies according to right at issue). But the material support law, for reasons explained 
by Justice Breyer in dissent, was not a snug fit with its asserted policy justifications. See HLP, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2736–37 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
38. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 681–83 (2008). Caveat lector: the author was counsel for 
the habeas petitioners in this case. The following discussion, however, draws exclusively on material 
available in the public domain. 
39. Id. at 693. 
40. Id. at 702. Of course, judges do this all the time in asylum and refugee cases.  
41. Indeed, the public record suggests cause for concern on this score. See Sam Dagher, Report 
Details Torture at Secret Baghdad Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, at A9. 
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presumption of executive competence and good faith. That presumption wholly 
ousted the factual inquiry that usually beats at the heart of the Great Writ. 
Both HLP and Munaf involved questions of law or mixed questions of fact 
and law. But it is worth noting that the same presumption of executive 
competence can be used to narrow or oust the scope of factual inquiry even 
when a court is clearly tasked with adjudicating whether specific facts fit within 
the bounds of a statutory authorization. In a series of cases involving challenges 
to the military detention of “enemy combatants” at the Guantánamo Naval Base 
under a September 2001 statute, for example, the D.C. Circuit has held that the 
government need only show a preponderance of the evidence to vindicate a 
detention decision, rejecting arguments that a “clear and convincing” standard 
was constitutionally mandated.42 It has also assigned a presumption of 
regularity to intelligence reports based on the claim that the Government has 
“the strongest incentive to produce accurate reports and no incentive to frame 
innocent bystanders.”43 In so doing it has arguably “come[] perilously close to 
suggesting that whatever the government says must be treated as true.”44 And 
by emphasizing that the Government need only “meet at least a certain 
minimum threshold of persuasiveness” to prevail,45 the circuit court has in 
effect amplified military detention authority without overtly altering the 
substantive law regulating such lock-ups. Under that standard, the D.C. Circuit 
has never found a detainee to be wrongfully detained.46 Given current law, one 
might doubt it ever will. 
42. See Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 
F.3d 866, 875–76 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
43. Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 752 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2011). This claim is at odds with the fact 
that the government, without prompting by a federal court, has released almost eighty percent of those 
detained at Guantánamo. See Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 401–
04 (2010) (collecting and presenting data in graphical and tabular form). The Latif majority misstates 
the problem by imagining a world with only two categories: proper detentions and “frame[d]” 
innocents. There is also a category of those who are detained simply in error, and there is no reason to 
believe that even the optimal approach to battlefield detentions will yield zero erroneous detentions.  
44. Latif, 666 F.3d at 779 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 849 
(D.C. Cir. 2008)). Judge Tatel, correctly in my view, explains that the Latif opinion ends the possibility 
of “meaningful” review through habeas corpus of Guantánamo detentions. Id. There is an intelligence 
report akin to the one relied on by the Latif court for every detainee that remains at the Cuban base. If 
the invocation of such reports endows the government’s case with a rebuttable presumption, the Latif 
ruling has in effect switched the burden of persuasion in a way that will be almost impossible to 
overcome. Since the D.C. Circuit had never identified a detainee worthy of release before Latif, 
though, it is possible to posit that the latter simply makes obvious what was previously implicit: 
detainees always lose.  
45. Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
46. In a related area of national security law, that court has also taken a narrow view of the 
permissible bounds of judicial review of orders freezing the assets of alleged terrorists. See, e.g., Holy 
Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003). But see People’s 
Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 613 F.3d 220, 225–28 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (exercising 
closer review of the designation of an alleged terrorist organization that had been delisted in Europe 
and the United Kingdom). 
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B. Separation of Powers Arguments for Mandatory Congressional Involvement 
A second line of precedent and scholarship rooted in the Separation of 
Powers contends that the Constitution mandates congressional involvement in 
hard decisions about security against terrorism. Legislative involvement does 
not mean leaving operative control in congressional hands. It is common 
ground that with the exception of impeachment and disciplining its members, 
Congress has little independent law-implementation authority. Advocates of 
Congress do not claim congressional exclusivity in counterterrorism. Instead, 
they propose that congressional involvement should be a necessary predicate 
for the legality of security-related actions by the executive. The basic intuition 
behind this claim is that the more ample deliberation implicit in legislative 
consideration conduces to wiser and more richly informed policy choices and 
minimizes the risk of insular cliques capturing and directing government power 
to their own ends.47 Two branches, simply put, are better than one. 
Two independent lines of reasoning derived from the Separation of 
Powers support the claims of mandatory congressional involvement. The first 
presumption is grounded again in a claim about Congress’s comparative 
institutional competence. It was summarized crisply by Justice Souter in a 
concurrence to the 2004 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision.48 In Hamdi, the Court 
confronted conflicting claims about the government’s authority to detain a 
citizen seized in relation to combat operations in Afghanistan.49 The parties to 
the case invoked two seemingly inconsistent statutes, the September 2001 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)50 and the 1971 Non-
Detention Act,51 to define the government’s detention authority. A plurality of 
the Court, with Justice O’Connor writing, held that the government’s claim of 
implied authority under the September 2001 authorization prevailed.52 Justice 
O’Connor emphasized “that Congress has the authority to determine that 
certain types of conduct can justify noncriminal detention in wartime, and that 
Congress had in fact authorized such detentions in the AUMF.”53 Writing for 
himself and Justice Ginsburg, however, Justice Souter elaborated on the need 
for more explicit congressional involvement and clearer evidence of legislative 
consideration of the detention question. He explained that absent such clear 
evidence, he found the Non-Detention Act to be the more relevant statutory 
authority.54 To justify his position, he articulated an account of the 
47. See, e.g., sources cited infra in notes 55 and 60.  
48. 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring). 
49. Id. at 510–11 (plurality opinion). 
50. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).  
51. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2006). 
52. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517–19 (plurality opinion). 
53. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
1013, 1045 (2008). 
54. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542–46 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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specialization of governmental functions informed by the Constitution’s 
Separation of Powers: 
[D]eciding finally on what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty 
whether in peace or war (or some condition in between) is not well 
entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose particular 
responsibility is to maintain security. For reasons of inescapable 
human nature, the branch of the Government asked to counter a serious 
threat is not the branch on which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in 
striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on 
the way to victory; the responsibility for security will naturally amplify 
the claim that security legitimately raises. A reasonable balance is 
more likely to be reached on the judgment of a different 
branch . . . . Hence the need for an assessment by Congress before 
citizens are subject to lockup, and likewise the need for a clearly 
expressed congressional resolution of the competing claims.55 
Justice Souter’s argument is premised on the empirical generalization that a 
deliberative multimember body is less likely to overestimate risks and to act 
precipitously than a lone institutional actor.56 To buttress that claim, Justice 
Souter could have added citations from the Federalist Papers, where Madison 
makes a similar “cooler heads” argument about the Senate,57 and the fourth 
Helvidius letter (also by Madison).58 In the security context, Justice Souter’s 
argument would conduce to a strong clear statement rule. Courts applying such 
55. Id. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring). For a scholarly development of this argument, see 
Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 CONN. L. REV. 
1549, 1602–08 (2009); accord GOODWIN LIU ET AL., KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION 118 
(2009) (“[F]idelity to the Constitution requires that we preserve, not abandon, the core principle of 
checks and balances by working within our system of divided power to meet new challenges through 
democratic means.”); Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: 
Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 398 (2008) (making a similar claim 
on doctrinal grounds); Deborah Pearlstein, The Constitution and Executive Competence in the Post-
Cold War World, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 547, 573 (2007) (“The past five years have taught 
the United States a particularly painful lesson in just how counterproductive to its security interests 
excessive secrecy—and unchecked executive authority—can be in counterterrorism intelligence 
operations.”). 
56. Legislative deliberation, by including new perspectives and thus new information, and by 
focusing reasoned debate, has other virtues that may conduce to better decisions. See JEREMY 
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 69–75 (1999) (setting forth virtues of collective deliberation). 
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 126 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (explaining 
that in a republic, the legislature would “refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through 
the medium of a chosen body . . . . ”); THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 366 (James Madison) (Isaac 
Kramnick ed., 1987) (“The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and 
numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions . . . .”). 
58. PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES, supra note 22, at 87 (“In no part of the constitution is 
more wisdom to be found than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the 
legislature, and not the executive department . . . . [T]he trust and the temptation would be too great for 
any one man . . . .”).  
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a rule would demand purposeful and unequivocal congressional involvement 
before endorsing controversial policies that touch on basic entitlements.59 
The second argument for necessary congressional involvement rests on an 
image of balance between the two political branches. This argument does not 
view one branch as better suited to addressing terrorism in the vein of Justice 
Souter’s claim. It rather posits that optimal policy emerges only if both 
branches are involved in decision making.60 Justice Blackmun captured the 
basic intuition of this bilateralism claim when he explained for the Court in 
Mistretta v. United States that “the Framers did not require—and indeed 
rejected—the notion that the three Branches must be entirely separate and 
distinct.”61 They instead created a system “of overlapping responsibility, a duty 
of interdependence as well as independence” and “differentiated government 
power.”62 The overlap between branches yields a “truly balanced system” of 
government.63 Each governmental decision then draws in diverse branches 
“with different democratic pedigrees, different incentives, and different 
interests.”64 This pushes diverse governmental actors with different information 
and different national constituencies—different “draws” from the same pool of 
national political preferences—to aggregate information and converge on 
action supported by a broad, informed public consensus. 
The Court has endorsed the proposition that bilateral counterterrorism 
policy making eases the way to judicial endorsement of policies in several 
cases. The notion is most clearly articulated in the concurrences of Justice 
59. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 50–56, 75–99 
(advocating that courts require clear congressional authorization of actions intruding on constitutional 
liberties). 
60. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN 
AGE OF TERRORISM 139 (2006) (arguing that courts should preserve the political equilibrium between 
the political branches); Samuel Issacharoff, Political Safeguards in Democracies at War, 29 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 192 (2009) (“[L]egislative oversight of executive conduct of war, both its 
engagement externally and its vigilance internally—is key to the survival of democracy under 
threat.”).  
61. 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). 
62. Id. at 381; see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“Separation of powers . . . operates on a horizontal axis to secure a proper balance of 
legislative, executive, and judicial authority.”). 
63. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 244 (1993) (White, J., concurring) (further noting 
“the basic principles of checks and balances underlying the Constitution's separation of powers is 
clear”); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) 
(endorsing the “purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the government”); JESSE H. 
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 275 (1980) (arguing that each branch “has 
tremendous incentives jealously to guard its constitutional boundaries”). For an insightful critique of 
balancing arguments in the Separation of Powers context, see M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real 
Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1155–57 (2000) (arguing that ideas of 
balance or separation provide no determinate answer to institutional design questions).  
64. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive 
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 1, 5 (2004). 
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Breyer and Justice Kennedy in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in which the Court held 
that military tribunals established by executive order in November 2001 
exceeded the President’s congressionally authorized war powers.65 Justice 
Stevens’s majority opinion in Hamdan focused on discord between the 
presidential military commission system and the statutory requirements of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice.66 But in his concurrence, Justice Kennedy, 
joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, emphasized the libertarian 
aspiration of the Constitution’s structure.67 Given that design goal, Justice 
Kennedy explained, the survival of a novel counterterrorism measure 
challenged in federal court turned on the fact of legislative involvement: 
“Congress has prescribed these limits [and] Congress can change them, 
requiring a new analysis consistent with the Constitution and other governing 
laws. At this time, however, we must apply the standards Congress has 
provided.”68 Justice Breyer’s concurrence, signed by the same Justices as 
Justice Kennedy’s, was more explicit. Bilateralism, explained Justice Breyer, 
“strengthens the Nation’s ability to determine—through democratic means—
how best to [respond to terrorism].”69 Because “[n]othing prevents the 
President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes 
necessary,” judicial enforcement of the Constitution’s bilateralism command 
simply increases the likelihood of informed, effective counterterrorism 
responses.70 Use of such a presumption in favor of bilateral political branch 
action might be thought desirable because it would obviate the need for more 
mundane but costly statutory or constitutional analysis of the fit between 
challenged policy and relevant law. 
Hamdan is not the only time the Court has conditioned endorsement of a 
counterterrorism policy on congressional involvement. The plurality opinion in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld also invoked the functional merits of bilateralism. After 
finding congressional support for the government’s claimed detention 
authority, Justice O’Connor encouraged bilateral authorization by raising the 
possibility of “appropriately authorized and properly constituted” procedures 
for fulfilling due process obligations.71 That is, congressional sanction would 
provide a safe harbor for more expansive detention measures in the future. 
In sum, judges have mined structural constitutionalism for presumptions 
that facilitate adjudication of statutory and rights-based challenges to novel 
counterterrorism measures. Such presumptions can reduce decision costs. 
65. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
66. Id. at 624–25 (identifying statutory standards). 
67. Id. at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Concentration of power puts personal liberty in peril 
of arbitrary action by officials, an incursion the Constitution’s three-part system is designed to 
avoid.”). It seems likely that Justice Stevens agreed with these sentiments.  
68. Id. at 653 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
69. Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
70. Id.  
71. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (plurality opinion).  
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Judges need only know how a policy was adopted, not how closely it fits with a 
statute or constitutional provision’s command. In this way, the Separation of 
Powers casts a larger shadow in counterterrorism jurisprudence than in other 
domains of law and policy. 
II. 
THE INTERNAL ECOLOGY OF THE BRANCHES AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
But do the presumptions of structural constitutionalism derived from 
eighteenth-century political theory and applied in HLP, Omar, Hamdi, and 
Hamdan (among other cases) hold water? Are they sufficiently empirically 
robust today to bear the weight the Justices and judges place upon them? The 
balance of this Article argues that structural constitutional presumptions cannot 
satisfy the demands imposed upon them by the federal bench in the 
counterterrorism domain. 
Drawing on political science and empirical research, this Part argues that 
the internal ecology of each branch undermines the empirical assumptions upon 
which such presumptions rest. To see the relevance of internal institutional 
ecology, notice first that the Separation of Powers presumptions isolated in Part 
I assume that the political branches are entities with stable, durable, and unitary 
characteristics. But neither Congress nor the executive is unitary.72 Congress 
has two houses, numerous committees, and operates under the shadow of the 
President’s veto. The executive too contains “a host of different organizational 
structures,”73 including departments, agencies, boards, commissions, advisory 
panels, and task forces.74 Nor is the net operation of these multiple components 
stable through time or across different policy functions. An analysis of each 
branch’s national security decision-making apparatus demonstrates that the 
attributions of executive speed or congressional deliberation upon which 
structural constitutional presumptions hinge are consequently contingent and 
empirically weak. 
This argument draws in an important way upon an insight first embodied 
in the “general theorem of the second-best” formulated by R.G. Lipsey and 
Kelvin Lancaster. This theorem states, “[I]f there is introduced into a general 
equilibrium system a constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the 
Paretian conditions [i.e., the circumstances that generate Pareto optimal 
outcomes], the other Paretian conditions, although still attainable, are, in 
general, no longer desirable.”75 The theorem shows that once a system peels 
72. The observation was made of Congress first in the classic article by Kenneth A. Shepsle, 
Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 239 
(1992). 
73. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3168 (2010) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
74. For a partial accounting, see id. at 3184–214. 
75. R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 11, 11 (1956). An allocation of resources or rights is optimal in the Paretian sense if there exists 
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away from the ideal on one axis, and thereby is second-best, welfare cannot be 
maximized by hewing to remaining first-best conditions.76 As a result, a failure 
to optimize one variable in a complex system means that other variables may 
need to take suboptimal values in order to secure a desirable result. My aim in 
this Part is to apply that theorem of the second-best to structural constitutional 
presumptions as follows. Judicial opinions about counterterrorism implicitly 
assume that the branches are first-best exemplars. But if branches do not live up 
to idealized standards, the theory of the second-best suggests that predictions 
based on the assumption of first-best conditions will be untrustworthy. There 
are systematic deviations from the ideals imagined in the Separation of Powers 
theory in our political world. It follows that inferences drawn on a first-best 
model of political institutions cannot stand. 
This second-best theorem also has implications for comparative claims of 
institutional competence. It undermines claims that one or the other branch has 
a clear comparative advantage based on institutional competence when 
assumptions of institutional optimality do not hold. When there is wide 
variance from institutional ideals on all sides, it is far from clear that 
comparative institutional advantage is a reliable heuristic when gauging the 
merits of disputed policy decisions. 
A. Executive (In)action Against Terrorism 
An analysis of institutional competence arguments on behalf of the 
executive branch should start with the observation that the executive is less an 
“it” than a “they.” What is typically characterized as the most unitary and 
single-minded of the branches is in fact diverse and plural. Abstractions about 
the executive’s speed and efficiency obscure the complexity of the executive’s 
actual operation, and hide details that undermine the President’s claim to 
functional primacy. 
Observation of this internal variety yields two grounds for rejecting a 
general logic of executive primacy. The first concerns that part of the 
administrative state dealing with terrorism. Those agencies are structured as 
political compromises by happenstance configurations of politics at their birth. 
Their subsequent development is path dependent and sclerotic. It is unlikely 
that they will develop, even over time, into optimal tools against organizations 
such as al-Qaeda. Second, because the tools available to the President to 
resolve institutional shortfalls are imprecise, costly, and blunted by trade-offs 
between expertise and control, the occupant of the White House is not well 
no other feasible allocation in which all individuals are at least as well-off, and at least one is strictly 
better off, than they were initially. 
76. For applications of the theory in legal academia, see Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 
2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7, 17–23 (2009) 
[hereinafter Vermeule, Foreword]; Adrian Vermeule, Hume’s Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 421, 421 (2003) [hereinafter Vermeule, Hume’s Second-Best]. 
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situated to identify and resolve agency-level design problems.77 Simply put, 
sometimes the executive will get it right, sometimes Congress will—and 
sometimes they will both err gravely. 
1. The Origins of Security Agencies 
The executive includes an embarrassment of agencies and departments 
tasked with counterterrorism missions, from the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The embedded 
structure and default modes of operation of these agencies are a function of 
historically situated political bargains channeled through Congress,78 which is 
usually instrumental in designing agencies.79 But legislators work with 
incomplete information and perverse incentives. As a result, agencies are 
highly unlikely to emerge well fashioned from the legislative lathe. If agency 
structures and mandates reflect legislated deals between historically situated 
interest groups and bureaucratic factions, each focused on parochial, often 
time-bound, concerns, the resulting institutional frameworks will not be 
“rationally designed” but rather “reflections of their political environment.”80 
To be sure, bargaining may sometimes throw up a stable, desirable equilibrium 
by happenstance. Federal Reserve independence, for example, was a happy 
result of interest-group dynamics in 1913.81 But if the Federal Reserve’s design 
is successful—although this is now contested—it was by mere fortuity.82 
Congress is not necessarily well suited to craft the bureaucracy that is 
systematically optimal. 
In the counterterrorism domain, a consequence of limited congressional 
capacity is that agencies function in ways their designers neither intend nor 
foresee. The result is a mix of foreordained failures and unexpected, if minor, 
successes. Consider one unsought success, the National Security Council 
(NSC), which is currently the interagency space for formulating national 
77. Confronted with second-best problems, political scientists have argued that it is sometimes 
possible to identify reforms that generate stable benefits in different institutional settings. Robert E. 
Goodin, Political Ideals and Political Practice, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 37, 55–56 (1995). Resort to the 
President as a “fixer” of agency-level problems is a solution of this kind.  
78. See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 
105 (2004) (noting that agencies are structured to “serve the interests of those who created” them).  
79. Usually but not always. See William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by 
Presidential Design, 64 J. POL. 1095 (2002) (analyzing creation of executive branch agencies by 
unilateral presidential action). 
80. AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC 8, 42 
(1999); cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative 
Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992) (suggesting that Congress pursues policy goals through 
agency design, for example, by deciding whether to create single- or multi-industry regulatory 
agencies).  
81. See Gyung-Ho Jeong et al., Political Compromise and Bureaucratic Structure: The 
Political Origins of the Federal Reserve System, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 472 (2008). 
82. For a helpful introduction to current debates on the role of the Federal Reserve, see DAVID 
WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC (2009).  
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security policy. The NSC was created by the 1947 National Security Act, but 
not on the basis of any design goal clearly formulated ex ante.83 The Navy first 
floated the idea of the NSC in legislative negotiations as a device to stave off 
consolidation with the War Department.84 A reluctant President Truman first 
agreed to inclusion of the NSC in the legislation, but then turned aside the 
Navy’s objections to unification.85 As a result, while the NSC remained in the 
final bill, it was stripped of its intended function, and left with only a “purely 
advisory” role.86 What is now the central organizing structure of national 
security law87 was in its origins a vestigial legacy of internecine interagency 
squabbling. The NSC is a success despite, not because of, its original design. 
By contrast, another product of the 1947 National Security Act, the CIA, 
“was born with crippling defects” as a result of fierce opposition from the 
Department of State and the Pentagon.88 It lacked a formal charter and for two 
years received no appropriations.89 The drafters of the 1947 Act never intended 
to create a powerful intelligence agency. To the contrary, the Act was drafted 
precisely to preserve the autonomy of each armed service’s freestanding 
intelligence operations and to tack onto them a “weak” coordinating body—the 
CIA.90 Paradoxically, the CIA grew in significance because the Act did not 
clearly delimit its responsibilities. This lacuna empowered presidents to employ 
the agency in ad hoc clandestine actions.91 
And yet, in a further irony, the Agency’s record proved dismal along 
many important metrics. It “failed daily” in its efforts to recruit Cold War–era 
human sources92 (a failure that seems to have persisted with respect to al-
83. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified in scattered 
portions of the U.S.C.); see JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 
FOR PERILOUS TIMES 105–10 (2007) (describing the National Security Council’s functions). The term 
NSC may be confusing because it can refer to cabinet officers who staff that body, to the larger group 
of agency and department heads that meet with the cabinet officials, or even to the bureaucrats who 
make up the staff of the “organization by which the various views and capabilities of the U.S. 
government are reconciled, harmonized, and, ideally, knit together to create effective action.” DAVID J. 
ROTHKOPF, RUNNING THE WORLD: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND 
THE ARCHITECTS OF AMERICAN POWER, at xiv (2005). I mean to reference all three aspects of the 
NSC in this discussion.  
84. ZEGART, supra note 80, at 57–62. 
85. Id.  
86. Id. at 67. Presidential treatment of the NSC subsequently veered wildly between ignoring it 
(Truman) to co-opting it (Eisenhower) to circumventing it but using its space as a White House foreign 
policy team (Kennedy). Id. at 79–84; ROTHKOPF, supra note 83, at 57 (arguing that the NSC was 
initially “seen as unwieldy and its role was ill defined”). 
87. See ROTHKOPF, supra note 83, at 29 (“[T]he National Security Council has come to be the 
hub of all U.S. international engagement . . . .”).  
88. TIM WEINER, LEGACY OF ASHES: THE HISTORY OF THE CIA 24 (2007).  
89. Id. at 25. 
90. ZEGART, supra note 80, at 165, 180–81. 
91. See id. at 187–90, 232. The Agency filled an “ecological niche[]” created by the White 
House’s need for covert action, and thereby flourished. PIERSON, supra note 78, at 73.  
92. WEINER, supra note 88, at 579.  
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Qaeda) and otherwise was unable to supply reliable intelligence on key 
issues.93 Both the successful growth and the mission failures of the Agency can 
arguably be traced back to an “initial hardwiring”94 that envisaged a very 
different path. 
The CIA’s history illustrates yet another salient institutional constraint on 
executive effectiveness: as an agency invests in expertise and turf battles, it 
becomes more set in its ways and hence more reluctant to reorient toward new 
problems and to respond to new policy challenges. The CIA’s early history was 
thus characterized by path-dependency-creating positive feedback loops 
leading to inflexible and inefficient investments.95 Having lavished attention on 
static, state-based enemies for decades, the post–Cold War CIA lacked 
linguistic skills, analytic capacity, and aptitude to address new threats in the 
more fragmented international environment. Additionally, security threats in 
the last decade differ critically from previous state-based threats because they 
evolve much faster.96 Worse, some have argued, Cold War intelligence 
investments in anti-Soviet movements provided subsequent infrastructure for 
terrorist groups in ways that U.S. intelligence did not apprehend or act to 
forestall.97 Agency personnel had sunk effort and time into developing skills, 
networks, and assets that were not merely irrelevant to new security challenges 
but positively detrimental. These sunk costs distorted the allocation of 
subsequent investments. 
Strenuous efforts by political appointees to change the Agency’s 
orientation in light of new threats failed. For example, in the 1990s the Director 
of Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet, pushed for greater attention to 
counterterrorism.98 He failed to overcome internal resistance. His promotion of 
greater interagency cooperation also foundered. Agency employees, for 
example, refused to give up identification badges issued by their old agencies 
93. See RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES, THE CIA AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 118 (3d ed. 2003) 
(describing the Agency as “accident-prone” and hobbled by faulty reasoning in the 1960s); ZEGART, 
supra note 80, at 190–95; see also SHANE HARRIS, THE WATCHERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S 
SURVEILLANCE STATE 95–98 (2010) (documenting one example of legislative skepticism of the 
CIA’s intelligence). 
94. Macey, supra note 80, at 101. 
95. For background on positive feedback loops, see PIERSON, supra note 78, at 17–18. For 
example, one leading counterterrorism specialist in the Pentagon later reflected candidly that “[e]ven at 
the height of the terror wave in the eighties he had never contemplated a massive assault on U.S. soil.” 
HARRIS, supra note 93, at 146. 
96. THOMAS FINGAR, REDUCING UNCERTAINTY: INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY 30 (2011). 
97. See generally IAN JOHNSON, A MOSQUE IN MUNICH: NAZIS, THE CIA, AND THE RISE OF 
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN THE WEST (2010) (arguing that post–World War II recruitment of 
Muslim soldiers from Central Asia into anti-Communist efforts morphed into more general support of 
the Muslim Brotherhood). 
98. AMY B. ZEGART, SPYING BLIND: THE CIA, THE FBI, AND THE ORIGINS OF 9/11, at 80–83 
(2007). 
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in favor of a system-wide one.99 Tribal pride beat out systemic efficacy. The 
net result of the agency’s “bounded rationality” and “structural secrecy” was to 
block most of Tenet’s efforts to revise “structures, habits, cultures, and 
procedures [that] had grown impervious to change after decades of fighting the 
Cold War.”100 The agency remained focused on older threats as al-Qaeda 
metastasized.101 In the years after Bin Laden fled from Sudan to Afghanistan to 
plot first the attack on the USS Cole and then the 9/11 attacks, “policy makers 
in the Clinton and Bush administrations didn’t have any overarching strategy 
for Afghanistan.”102 In the immediate run up to the attacks on New York and 
Washington, the executive branch was “strangely somnambulant” about the 
threat from al-Qaeda, and still fixated on state-based threats.103 Even after 9/11, 
although the CIA and the FBI claimed to change gears quickly,104 subsequent 
studies have identified a persisting “inability to respond creatively to 
failures.”105 
Recent institutional reforms have had equally ambiguous outcomes. There 
remain “political constraints on reorganizing the intelligence community”106 
that result in second-best institutional realities. The 2004 reorganization of the 
intelligence services, for example, failed to address excessive interservice 
diffusion of intelligence functions because of Defense Department 
opposition.107 The same Act failed to resolve interagency conflicts between the 
CIA and FBI.108 Even after the Act’s passage, the Pentagon still actively 
resisted coordinating efforts by the new Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI).109 That new coordinating job was in any event compromised at birth by 
 99. Id. at 82. 
100. Id. at 90–91, 99–100; see also LOCH K. JOHNSON, THE THREAT ON THE HORIZON: AN 
INSIDE ACCOUNT OF AMERICA’S SEARCH FOR SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR 8 (2011) (“In a new, 
uncertain world, the CIA seemed to have lost its way.”); id. at 366 (noting failure of intelligence 
reform efforts in the late 1990s). 
101. On the eve of 9/11, the CIA’s al-Qaeda unit had been relegated to the basement, WEINER, 
supra note 88, at 483, and there was no system-wide organization focused on counterterrorism. 
Thomas H. Hammond, Why Is the Intelligence Community So Difficult to Redesign? Smart Practices, 
Conflicting Goals, and the Creation of Purpose–Based Organizations, 20 GOVERNANCE 401, 419 
(2007).  
102. PETER L. BERGEN, THE LONGEST WAR: THE ENDURING CONFLICT BETWEEN AMERICA 
AND AL-QAEDA 41 (2011). 
103. Id. at 43. To be precise, most of Bergen’s criticism is directed at the political leadership, 
and not the agencies. See id. at 47–50 (documenting George Tenet’s failed efforts to motivate White 
House action in early 2001).  
104. ZEGART, supra note 98, at 175–76. 
105. ROBERT JERVIS, WHY INTELLIGENCE FAILS: LESSONS FROM THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION 
AND THE IRAQ WAR 178 (2010). 
106. Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and 
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1701 (2006). 
107. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458, 118 
Stat. 3638 (2004). 
108. See RICHARD A. POSNER, COUNTERING TERRORISM: BLURRED FOCUS, HALTING STEPS 
21–22, 33–69, 108 (2007). 
109. ZEGART, supra note 98, at 184.  
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disagreements between the House and the Senate, with House leaders 
protesting that Senate-driven reorganization under a strong DNI would imperil 
intelligence support for the military.110 Paradoxically, the 2004 reform may 
have made failures to interdict terrorism attempts more likely. It set in motion 
an “intramural controversy” between DNI Dennis Blair and DCI Leon Panetta 
that displaced effort and attention from external threats to internal turf wars.111 
“[O]verlapping responsibility” for “all-source analysis on terrorism” hence did 
not improve threat prediction.112 What it did instead was redirect White House 
energies away from threat assessment and toward bureaucratic infighting.113 
The ambiguous effect of post-9/11 reorganizations is also evident in the 
electronic surveillance domain, where initiatives to improve security along one 
dimension have diminished security along other dimensions. Recent federal law 
enforcement efforts to amplify its capacity to intercept communications on the 
Internet have, according to some critics, the potential to create a greater risk of 
breaches and exfiltration of private internet security.114 This apparently 
underappreciated risk-risk trade-off arose because no one agency has specific 
statutory responsibility for systemic security.115 This dynamic shows how a 
dearth of coordination can contribute to cracks in national security. 
Similarly, the 2004 legislative reorganization creating the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) did not result in clear efficiency gains and may even 
have had perverse and harmful policy effects.116 Reform efforts that yielded the 
DHS were animated by the White House’s “domestic policy priorities 
independent of homeland security” and by legislators’ desire to expand 
committee jurisdictions.117 A deregulation-focused White House pushed to 
bundle nonsecurity functions into DHS in the hope of using a departmental 
110. Patrick C. Neary, Intelligence Reform, 2001–2009: Requiescat in Pace?, 54 STUD. 
INTELLIGENCE 1, 2–3 (2010); see also James Kirchick, Turf Warrior, Can Dennis Blair Save U.S. 
Intelligence, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 25, 2010, at 12. For another example of interagency conflict, see 
HARRIS, supra note 93, at 212–13.  
111. See Kirchick, supra note 110, at 1.  
112. SUMMARY OF THE WHITE HOUSE REVIEW OF THE DECEMBER 25, 2009 ATTEMPTED 
TERRORIST ATTACK 4 (2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/summary_of_wh_review 
_12-25-09.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE REVIEW] (“[T]he overlapping layers of protection within the 
[counterterrorism] community failed to track [the] threat in a manner sufficient to ensure all leads were 
followed . . . .”). 
113. See Greg Miller, White House Intervenes as Intel Directors Bicker, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 
2009, at C13 (noting White House resolution of a dispute over the hierarchy of spies in foreign 
countries).  
114. See SUSAN LANDAU, SURVEILLANCE OR SECURITY?: THE RISKS POSED BY NEW 
WIRETAPPING TECHNOLOGIES 243–48 (2010). 
115. Id. at 245. 
116. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 
117. Dara Kay Cohen et al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design 
of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. REV. 673, 678, 693–94 (2006).  
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“revenue neutral[ity]” rule to whittle away at those functions.118 While 
President Bush’s deregulatory agenda played a catalytic role in the 
reorganization, he was only partially successful in securing his goals. The 
Republican-controlled Congress resisted presidential proposals to control 
agency transfers, to redistribute appropriations, and to appoint assistant 
secretaries without Senate confirmation.119 DHS’s creation nevertheless 
changed the mix of policy tools used to address terrorism, albeit in ways that 
reflect the balance of power at the time of the department’s creation rather than 
any theory of optimal security agency design. Government components 
included in the new DHS were pressed toward a counterterrorism focus.120 
Agencies escaping consolidation, including the FBI and the Defense 
Department’s Northern Command, maintained a more varied mandate.121 The 
match between agency and function was, in the end, the fortuitous result of 
politicking at the time of the 2004 legislation’s enactment and not deliberate 
design. 
To summarize, the DHS’s and other security agencies’ development 
trajectories suggest that agency structure and jurisdiction are side effects of 
exogenous political agendas. It is only by happenstance that such dynamics can 
on rare occasions produce agency structures optimally designed for 
counterterrorism.122 
2. The Limits of Presidential Control 
All is not lost for claims of executive primacy. The executive is a 
hierarchy. At its apex sits the President, who is believed to have broad authority 
to fix problems arising in the bureaucracy below.123 Even if agencies are flawed 
at birth, the vesting of unitary control in the Oval Office should in theory 
enable the President to reform and improve agency structure. In this vein, some 
scholars have argued that the President has extensive tools of “supervision” that 
allow the White House to set agencies’ policy agendas and convert 
“administrative activity into an extension of [the presidential] policy and 
political agenda,”124 especially in the absence of congressional competition.125 
118. See Benjamin H. Friedman, Managing Fear: The Politics of Homeland Security, in 
TERRORIZING OURSELVES: WHY U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 
185, 207 (Benjamin H. Friedman et al. eds., 2010).  
119. Cohen et al., supra note 117, at 697. 
120. See, e.g., id. at 736–37 (examining this effect with respect to the Coast Guard). 
121. Friedman, supra note 118, at 208. 
122. Cf. Cohen et al., supra note 117, at 712 (arguing that legislative design ends in “legal 
mandates [that] are often, perhaps even typically, not designed to succeed at achieving their stated 
goals”); id. at 753–54 (doubting cost-benefit justifications for DHS).  
123. See generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008) (arguing in favor of broad 
presidential power to control the administration). 
124. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2282, 2285–90 
(2001); see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 
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Additionally, political incentives will align to promote vigorous use of such 
tools because presidents take a greater share of blame or praise for national 
performance than other elected actors and so take a more national 
perspective.126 Even if presidents are constrained by crowded agendas, the Oval 
Office is therefore thought to be “in the best position” in terms of both 
incentives and tools to mitigate agency costs.127 
But there are a number of problems with this account of presidential 
primacy. A threshold problem with claims on behalf of presidential control is 
that they may be flawed on technical, legal grounds. Congress may have crafted 
a framework statute in ways that render presidential control over policy 
decisions ambiguous. There is ongoing debate, for example, as to the scope of 
presidential supervisory authorization when Congress drafts a statute to assign 
a task to a specific department, agency, or official.128 However this debate is 
resolved, it is sufficient to observe here that legal uncertainty may create 
constraints on presidential control. 
More generally, while the vesting of unitary control in the Oval Office 
could in theory enable the President to reform and improve agency structure, 
the linkage between the political leadership in the White House and the 
bureaucracy is not without friction. The bureaucracy is an agent of the 
President, and in any agency relationship there will be slack between the 
principal and the agent.129 As a result, when acting through the bureaucracy the 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 102–03 (1994) (making a “structural argument” for the unitary executive); Peter L. 
Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 181, 185–88 (1986) (describing historical genesis of presidential review). 
125. When both Congress and the President are competing for agency control, agencies have 
greater discretion. See Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: 
Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a 
Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 143, 162 (1996). 
126. Kagan, supra note 124, at 2310–11; Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the 
Politics of Structure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11 (1994). For literature challenging this 
assumption, see infra text accompanying note 221. 
127. Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 768 (1984).  
128. Compare Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 263, 267 (2006) (arguing against the “recurring claim that statutes conferring power 
on executive officials should be read to include the President as an implied recipient of authority”), 
with Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the President’s 
Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 991–94 (1993) (defending the view that the President 
retains constitutional authority to substitute his or her judgment for judgment of executive official 
delegated authority by Congress, even when Congress prohibits presidential intervention). Many 
important national security initiatives have been taken without a clear statutory allocation of authority 
to the White House. See, e.g., Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918, 918 (2002), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. 
§ 801 note at 346 (2006) (establishing military tribunals, claiming authority “as Commander in Chief 
of the Armed Forces of the United States by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of 
America, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution . . . and sections 821 
and 836 of title 10, United States Code” (citation omitted)). 
129. Agency costs arise when a task is delegated to an agent for which care or effort is 
required, and for which the principal can observe outcomes, but not the agent’s level of care or effort. 
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President cannot obtain the speed and decisiveness of executive action without 
paying agency costs. In practice, presidential control is further limited by a 
trade-off between control and expertise.130 
Presidents have two main options to control agency costs. They can either 
centralize power by “shift[ing] the locus of effective decisionmaking authority” 
up to the White House,131 or they can “politicize” agencies using their 
appointment power, at least to the extent Congress has not insulated the 
agency.132 Both mechanisms, of course, assume presidents have sufficient 
political capital, although that is hardly a given.133 
A threshold problem for presidents in overcoming agency costs in the 
counterterrorism domain is that they have limited tools at their disposal. 
Consider centralization first. The instruments used to centralize control in the 
White House are less powerful in the national security domain than in other 
policy areas. White House control of most agency policy is centralized in 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review of regulations.134 OMB 
review, though, does not touch many security matters.135 
Instead, the President relies on an Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism.136 This reliance on a personal presidential 
If outcomes are imperfectly correlated with care and effort, the agent can exert suboptimal efforts or 
extract rents. Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 225 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000).  
130. See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL 
INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946–1997, at 29–30 (2003) 
(identifying possible trade-off). A further source of agency costs is inattention by agency officials to 
commands in the form of laws or internal instructions. See JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON 
WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION 165 (3d ed. 1984) (noting that “‘street-level’ bureaucrats are 
notorious for being too busy coping with their day-to-day problems to recite to themselves the policies 
they are supposed to apply”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist 
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1261–62 (2006). This observation raises questions 
about the efficacy of any system of formal rules as an instrument of internal administrative control. 
131. Moe & Wilson, supra note 126, at 18; see also DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF 
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 30–42 
(2008) (cataloguing forms of political control). 
132. Congress will insulate an agency through constraints on presidential removal during 
periods of divided government when Congress expects that a hostile President will remain in office for 
some significant time. LEWIS, supra note 131, at 49–55, 68–69. 
133. Cf. TIMOTHY NAFTALI, BLIND SPOT: THE SECRET HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
COUNTERTERRORISM 315–16 (2005) (emphasizing political constraints on President Clinton’s ability 
to respond aggressively to al-Qaeda). 
134. Kagan, supra note 124, at 2281–309 (describing OMB review in Clinton years); see also 
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 
1763–64 (2007); Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1263–68 (2006) (documenting history of presidential review).  
135. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, §§ 2(b), 3(d)(2), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended 
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (2006) (“Regulations or rules that pertain to a military or foreign affairs 
function of the United States, other than procurement regulations and regulations involving the import 
or export of non-defense articles and services” are excluded from OMB review.). 
136. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE REVIEW, supra note 112, at 1.  
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envoy rests on Cold War foundations.137 Since the Eisenhower administration, 
presidents have placed confidants in assistant positions as a personalized 
mechanism for securing information and exercising control over national 
security agencies.138 White House control via formal OMB review, though, is 
more potent than personalized channels. OMB review provides regularized and 
predictable screening of agency decisions on behalf of the White House, rather 
than mere ad hoc intrusion based on periodic political pressure.139 The 
staggering volume of intelligence—“some 50,000 separate serialized 
intelligence reports under 1,500 titles” annually140—also makes it hard to see 
how a personalized oversight structure could ever be even remotely effective in 
ensuring that all items of importance (and only items of real importance) reach 
the Oval Office. 
Even if more rigorous centralization were available (for example, by 
creating a “security OMB”), it is not clear presidents would seek it out. 
Although presidents sometimes benefit by controlling agencies, they also 
benefit from the possibility of denying responsibility for agency activities that 
violate federal law or that fail.141 Implementing covert CIA plans in the Cold 
War, agencies thus “concealed their programs from those in higher authority” 
to minimize these political costs.142 It is unlikely presidents would wish to 
maximize their control over security agencies given such downside risks. The 
optimal executive structure, from the perspective of the Oval Office, likely 
includes some agency insulation to vest the White House with plausible 
deniability. 
Gains from centralization are further constrained because presidents face 
“team production” problems with respect to national security agencies that limit 
their ability to identify and remedy failing system components.143 That is, 
security policy emerges from interactions between multiple agencies with 
137. See National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 401 (2006)); ZEGART, supra note 80, at 81–85. 
138. ZEGART, supra note 80, at 80–85. 
139. Policy makers are often better off if they are able to promulgate rules rather than engage in 
ad hoc policy direction. Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The 
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473, 473–74 (1977). 
140. DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW 
AMERICAN SECURITY STATE 80 (2011).  
141. For a summary of the historical evidence that presidents during the Cold War sought such 
plausible deniability, see FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND 
UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 37–43 (2007).  
142. S. REP. NO. 94-755, FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY 
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, BOOK 1, at 11 (1976). 
143. Team production problems arise when multiple agents, each with fixed compensation, are 
assigned a single task; individual contributions cannot be recognized, and compensation depends on 
net effort. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779–81 (1972).  
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overlapping tasks of collection, assessment, coordination, and analysis.144 It is 
hard to monitor and motivate appropriately all participants in this process. The 
cacophonous overlap of national security agencies resists consolidation or 
coordination. For example, before a Christmas 2009 attempt to down a U.S.-
bound flight, both the CIA and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
conducted relevant threat analysis.145 While such “intentional redundancy” can 
reduce the risk of policy failure,146 it also thins accountability and makes it 
more difficult for the President to know which agency to blame when matters 
go awry. Studies of the national security bureaucracy further suggest that the 
sheer complexity of agency design means that officials producing intelligence 
“are not fully in control of program budgeting” and are “never held accountable 
for failures in intelligence production.”147 
Additionally, using politicization as a tool to control security agencies can 
only be employed at a price. The use of political appointments inevitably 
removes agency discretion to stray from White House preferences. Eliminating 
such discretion decreases the incentives of agencies to acquire information and 
take policy initiatives.148 Political appointees, moreover, “reduce overall 
bureaucratic competence.”149 One much-studied example of an agency in which 
presidential control was seemingly inversely correlated to expertise is the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, a highly politicized agency under the 
second President Bush that was widely condemned for its performance during 
Hurricane Katrina.150 Another example from the counterterrorism domain is the 
CIA. A 2004 effort by President George W. Bush to exercise closer control of 
the CIA through the appointment of former Congressman Porter Goss led to the 
exit of “almost every one of the CIA’s most senior officers” and “ferocious” 
144. See, e.g., DONALD F. KETTL, SYSTEM UNDER STRESS: HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
AMERICAN POLITICS 39 (2d ed. 2007) (“[T]he federal government [has] extraordinary expertise, but 
that expertise [is] highly compartmentalized.”). Team production dilemmas within government are 
described in Moe, supra note 127, at 750–51, 762–64 (noting that in government, the usual market 
mechanism of using the residual rents that are ordinarily produced through market transactions to 
motivate monitoring will not work because in government “there is no residual in the ordinary sense of 
the term” and “slack is not a functional substitute for the economic residual”).  
145. See WHITE HOUSE REVIEW, supra note 112, at 3. 
146. Id.  
147. WILLIAM E. ODOM, FIXING INTELLIGENCE: FOR A MORE SECURE AMERICA 86–87 (2d 
ed. 2003); see also PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 140, at 85 (“[W]asteful redundancy is endemic in Top 
Secret America . . . cultivated by the bureaucratic instinct that bigger is always better, and by the speed 
at which big departments like defense allowed their subagencies to grow.”). 
148. See Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, 105 J. 
POL. ECON. 1, 3, 27 (1997). 
149. David E. Lewis, Testing Pendleton’s Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse 
Bureaucrats?, 69 J. POL. 1073, 1074, 1084–86 (2007). 
150. LEWIS, supra note 131, at 170 (finding both less skilled management and “hidden effects 
on the morale, tenure, and incentives of career managers” in FEMA due to politicization). 
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internal resentment.151 Such internal resistance is expensive for the White 
House. “[B]ureaucratic expertise is endogenous, costly, and relationship 
specific”: it will be developed only when government induces its agents to 
invest in relationship-specific skills by granting job security and “some 
measure of control.”152 Efforts at reining in the bureaucracy, in short, risk 
destroying the very expertise the President seeks to control. 
Hostile agencies can also raise the price of both centralization and 
politicization by engaging in selective leaking to Congress and the press to 
undermine presidential agendas.153 National security agencies have a storied 
record of resisting political appointees’ control with selective disclosures.154 
Most presidents anticipate such agency pushback against centralization or 
politicization efforts and trim their sails accordingly.155 For this reason, de facto 
agency independence may often be the equilibrium outcome in the national 
security domain. 
Limits to centralization and the trade-offs implicit in politicization have 
frustrated presidents for decades. As one scholar has noted, “no modern 
president has been fully satisfied with his institutional resources in national 
security policy. Whether in gathering information, analyzing and presenting 
policy options, or implementing particular programs, national security agencies 
appear to frustrate chief executives more than they please.”156 There is no 
reason to expect departures from this pattern now. Presidential control, in short, 
is no panacea for the limits of agency design. To the contrary, it may be a 
source of additional frictions on effective counterterrorism policy. 
151. WEINER, supra note 88, at 502; see also LEWIS, supra note 131, at 92–93 (noting decline 
in morale and exodus of significant numbers of middle management). Goss, in any case, failed, lasting 
less than two years. See POSNER, supra note 108, at 19. 
152. Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, 
and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 874, 886 (2007). 
153. See, e.g., WEINER, supra note 88, at 503–04. 
154. For example, the CIA resisted proposed reforms by President Carter’s outsider nominee 
for DCI, Stansfield M. Turner, who later commented that “he had been outmaneuvered by a 
bureaucracy that often treats outsiders like a hostile virus.” Mark Mazzetti, A Difficult Road Awaits 
Panetta at the CIA, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, at A19. President Obama’s initial nominee, Leon 
Panetta, another outsider, faced similar resistance. Id.; see also Mark Mazzetti, Obama Seeks to Mend 
Party Rift over Panetta, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, at A15 (“Deciding whether the director of the 
C.I.A. should be chosen from within the agency or installed from outside has confounded American 
presidents since the agency was established after World War II as the successor to the Office of 
Strategic Services.”). 
155. Moreover, the choice between politicization and centralization will depend in part on the 
President’s relationship with Congress, and not solely on which option is more efficient. Cf. LEWIS, 
supra note 131, at 96 (noting that the costs of politicization differ in divided and unified government). 
156. ZEGART, supra note 80, at 46. 
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3. The Price of Executive Primacy 
Executive primacy has surprising costs. Evidence suggests that analytic 
failures are common in federal counterterrorism policy.157 Much effort is 
currently wasted or misdirected, while resources and information are poorly 
deployed. Consider as illustration the Christmas 2009 attempt by Nigerian 
national Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to explode a bomb aboard Northwest 
Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit. Two months earlier, Saudi 
officials had warned U.S. authorities that an attack of the type Abdulmutallab 
tried was being planned in Yemen.158 Weeks before the attempt, 
Abdulmutallab’s father approached the CIA in Lagos to warn them of his son’s 
links to Yemeni terrorist groups.159 Nothing was done. Subsequent presidential 
and congressional inquiries found an “overall systemic failure”: intelligence 
agencies had “dots [that] were never connected.”160 Far from an isolated 
incident, this failure appears symptomatic. Five years beforehand, the National 
Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States reached a similar 
diagnosis respecting 9/11. It found that “no one was firmly in charge of 
managing [threat information] . . . and able to draw relevant intelligence from 
anywhere in the government” about the 9/11 attacks.161 A similar failure of 
analysis preceded the deadly November 5, 2009, shootings at Fort Hood, 
Texas,162 where the military intelligence unit tasked with tracking internal 
threats focused instead on student associations163 that were more readily 
analyzed but ultimately harmless. It is clear, therefore, that the executive 
branch has not wholly heeded the 9/11 Commission’s warnings. 
157. Unsurprisingly, veterans of the intelligence community contest this assessment. See 
FINGAR, supra note 96, at 3, 9 (contesting ascriptions of intelligence failure). 
158. In an October 2009 White House briefing, Saudi intelligence head Muhammad bin Nayef 
raised concerns about the growing al-Qaeda threat from Yemen, specifically warning of bombs sewn 
into clothing. Mark Hosenball et al., The Radicalization of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, NEWSWEEK, 
Jan. 11, 2010, at 37. Intelligence agencies failed to take this as a basis for additional aviation scrutiny. 
Karen DeYoung & Michael A. Fletcher, U.S. Was More Focused on al-Qaeda’s Plans Abroad Than 
for Homeland, Report on Airline Bomb Plot Finds, WASH. POST, Jan. 8. 2010, at A1.  
159. James Gordon Meek, Failure to Communicate. Bumbling Counterterror Agency Never 
Tried to Follow Up on Clues Month Before Bomb Try, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 31, 2009, at 5. 
160. WHITE HOUSE REVIEW, supra note 112, at 4; accord S. REP. NO. 111-199, ATTEMPTED 
TERRORIST ATTACK ON NORTHWEST AIRLINES FLIGHT 253, at 1–2 (2010), available at 
http://intelligence.senate.gov/100518/report.pdf; Paul Rosenzweig, Connecting the Dots and the 
Christmas Plot, NAT’L SEC. J. (Jan. 25, 2010, 7:50 AM), http://www.harvardnsj.com/2010/01/ 
connecting-the-dots-and-the-christmas-plot.  
161. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 400 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. 
162. An intelligence analyst identified email messages from Major Nidal Malik Hasan to 
Yemeni cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who has promoted violence, but did not flag or forward that 
information. Scott Shane & James Dao, Investigators Study Tangle of Clues on Fort Hood Suspect, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1.  
163. Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, WASH. 
POST, July 19, 2010, at A1. 
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To summarize, the internal architecture of national security institutions 
within the executive branch can hinder just as much as it can foster rapid, 
informed responses to terrorism. Presidential control through Article II’s 
assumed unitary hierarchy provides no panacea. There is hence no reason to 
believe that executive responses to terrorism will either be optimal or even as 
accurate, timely, and efficient as is generally believed. The institutional 
competence logic of pro-executive structural constitutional presumptions thus 
rests on shaky ground. 
B. Legislative Incentives to Deliberate and Congressional 
Responses to Terrorism 
What of Congress as a necessary partner against terrorism? This Section 
develops two criticisms of the Separation of Powers arguments that celebrate 
Congress’s role in counterterrorism policy making. First, Congress tends to 
respond to rather than anticipate terrorism risks. As a result, legislative change 
is likely to lag behind the need for policy innovation. Second, while effective 
legislation requires information, Congress lacks mechanisms in the 
counterterrorism domain to gather sufficient information or to oversee how 
agencies are putting statutory commands into operation. Given these 
conditions, the Madisonian belief in the benefits of congressional deliberation 
seems less than convincing when applied to the counterterrorism context. By 
extension, judicial identification of legislative involvement as the sine qua non 
of well-crafted policy may be misguided. 
1. Legislating Too Little, Too Late 
Passing laws in the United States is difficult. In addition to Article I, 
Section 7’s bicameralism and presentment requirements, both Houses have 
developed additional internal procedures to address information asymmetries 
and what political scientists have termed “cycling” problems164 that further 
impede statutory enactment. While congressional committees address 
informational and agenda-setting needs,165 acting as counterweights to the 
executive’s informational and agenda-setting advantages, they also operate as 
164. Cycling refers to the instability of collective choice within multimember bodies such as 
legislatures. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 
1963) (providing general conditions under which the exercise of collective choices through majority-
rule voting does not yield stable outcomes); Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority 
Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971, 984–88 (1989) (describing briefly 
cycling and the underlying voting paradox). Cycling is often thought to be resolved through agenda-
setting mechanisms and other legislative rules. Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-
Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503, 507 (1981) (arguing that 
“institutional restrictions on the domain of exchange induce stability, not legislative exchange per se” 
(emphasis omitted)); see generally KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. 
LAWMAKING 14–16 (1998) (exploring institutional solutions to cycling).  
165. See Barbara Sinclair, The Role of Committees in Agenda Setting in the U.S. Congress, 11 
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 35, 37 (1986). 
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supplemental “veto gates” (necessary stages in legislation where a group has 
the ability to derail a bill) that supplement the baseline of three (bicameralism 
and the veto) or five (including two supermajority votes if the President 
opposes a law).166 
The organization of the legislative process around so many sequential 
constitutional and subconstitutional veto gates ramps up the enactment costs of 
new statutory policies considerably. At each veto gate, a different, often 
submajoritarian, coalition can hold up a bill. So long as at least one pivotal 
coalition favors the status quo, or resists being bought off, no change will 
occur. As a corollary, “only when the status quo is extreme relative to the ideal 
points of the president and [all] pivotal legislators” will Congress converge on a 
new policy.167 As even casual observation of Capital Hill reveals, the result is 
long stretches of inactivity punctuated by frantic moments of change when “old 
policies . . . are out of equilibrium with respect to current preferences.”168 
This model of congressional action implies that Congress’s interventions 
will be responsive and not anticipatory. In the counterterrorism domain, 
Congress’s tendency to move only when it is too late is particularly acute. 
Anticipatory policies would be hard to craft even if Congress had the necessary 
expertise. Before an attack, the high variance in terrorists’ strategies169 renders 
policy prescription difficult. Until 2001, there was also little constitutional 
jurisprudence illuminating the boundaries of permissible counterterrorism 
coercion and targeting, such that Congress faced the additional burden of 
writing on a largely blank slate so far as constitutional jurisprudence was 
concerned. 
Experience after 9/11 shows responsive lawmaking to be the norm. In 
some cases, it illustrates how congressional involvement can be affirmatively 
harmful. Consider four waves of post-9/11 legislation in turn. A first wave of 
post-9/11 security legislation, including the 2001 Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force170 and the USA PATRIOT Act,171 responded to the 9/11 attacks. 
However wise the diverse regulatory changes contained in these laws might 
166. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1441, 1444–48 (2008) (describing opportunities for House or Senate members to derail proposed 
legislation at “vetogates.”). 
167. KREHBIEL, supra note 164, at 35.  
168. Id. at 46; see also George Tsebelis, Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in 
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 289, 293 
(1995). The use of supermajoritarian procedures, including both the veto override and the filibuster, 
means that it will often be the case that a losing coalition is larger than a mere majority. Id. at 38–39. 
169. See OFFICE OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 7 
(2002), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_hls.pdf (“One fact dominates all 
homeland security threat assessments: terrorists are strategic actors . . . . Where we insulate ourselves 
from one form of attack, they can shift and focus on another exposed vulnerability.”). 
170. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001).  
171. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 283 
(codified in scattered titles and sections of the U.S.C.). 
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have been, they were nothing if not untimely. The second wave then responded 
to court opinions. In 2004, the Supreme Court issued opinions setting forth new 
constitutional rules for detainees.172 In the aftermath of those cases, Congress 
enacted a new jurisdictional scheme stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to 
consider habeas petitions by Guantánamo prisoners and placing detention 
review in the hands of Combatant Status Review Tribunals and Administrative 
Review Boards.173 When that was partially invalidated,174 Congress, at the 
President’s urging, reinstalled jurisdictional changes along with a reworked 
military commission scheme to replace the framework invalidated by the 
Court.175 The net gain from this second set of legislative interventions might, 
without much exaggeration, be characterized as hundreds (perhaps thousands) 
of pages of recondite briefing and law review articles about federal 
jurisdictional issues without much by way of policy change. 
A third wave of responsive lawmaking was Congress’s reaction to the 
9/11 Commission report, which took the form of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.176 While the net effect of that sprawling and 
complex law’s reform of the intelligence community is hard to evaluate, some 
of its main impacts have been plausibly characterized as “obviously 
problematic.”177 For example, the law failed to allocate authority over hiring 
and firing decisions in the intelligence community to the new DNI, prompting 
President Bush’s first choice as intelligence “czar” to decline the proposed 
appointment.178 In other words, the reorganization was facially so flawed that 
the arguably most qualified person for intelligence community leadership 
turned down the task. 
Finally, Congress’s enactment in 2007 of statutory amendments to the 
framework for electronic surveillance was again a response to judicial 
pushback against ongoing mass surveillance programs.179 Although no 
172. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (recognizing U.S. citizen’s right 
of judicial review of grounds for military detention); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) 
(extending statutory habeas jurisdiction to Guantánamo Bay). 
173. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, § 1005, 119 Stat. 
2680, 2739 (2006). 
174. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006). 
175. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–
36 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and note) (revoking any “court, justice, or 
judge[’s] . . . jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on 
behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have 
been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination”). This provision was 
invalidated in Boumediene. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008). 
176. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 
Stat. 3638 (2004). 
177. PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 140, at 97–98. 
178. Id. (describing reasons for Robert Gates’s decision not to take the post of DNI in 2005); 
see also supra text accompanying notes 107–112.  
179. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-261, § 108, 122 Stat. 2436, 2464; JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND 
JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 90–94, 181 (2007) (recounting enactment history). 
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comprehensive account of those statutory amendments’ effects is yet available, 
the 2007 law at a minimum introduced considerable new complexity and 
opacity into the law of electronic surveillance, making any democratic 
accounting of executive action in this domain much more elusive. The record 
of responsive lawmaking, in short, only highlights the dim prospects for 
congressional leadership in the counterterrorism policy realm. 
The legislative tendency to act only too late may be entrenched beyond 
repair. Legislators are driven by electoral incentives. They tend to be downside-
risk-averse due to the lopsided incentives created by our first-past-the-post 
election mechanism and, as a result, unlikely to generate breakthrough ideas 
about how counterterrorism should work. To see why, notice that politicians in 
a first-past-the-post system seek only the barest majority necessary to win.180 
Beyond that, they have scant incentive to work for more votes. Incumbents thus 
benefit little from large upswings of support, but may be leery of small 
downward drops in electoral support because generally they hold their seats by 
small margins. Members of Congress, therefore, may view innovations in 
counterterrorism policy that have uncertain effects with skepticism, as they fear 
the downside risk (loss of a seat) more than they desire the upside benefit 
(victory by a more comfortable margin).181 
2. Electoral Incentives and the Substance of Counterterrorism Lawmaking 
Electoral pressures also influence along several significant vectors the 
types of proposals legislators will support when pressed by circumstance to act. 
First, rational legislators may prefer to support proposals that originate outside 
Congress because in such cases responsibility for the policies’ consequences 
can be shared with others. 
Second, legislators may be more skeptical about pro-liberty than about 
pro-security proposals. Error costs on the liberty margin involve harms to 
discrete, potentially scattered individuals. Errors on the security side are more 
likely to be widespread, affecting many people and imposing a high political 
cost. Pro-liberty innovation thus has a greater downside risk at the polls than 
pro-security innovation. As a result, pro-liberty legislative action is less likely 
than new pro-security law. A parallel dynamic has played out in the politics of 
crime control. Elected officials worry about relaxing crime controls and being 
blamed for high-profile crimes (which affect many electors) more than they 
180. For a classic discussion of electoral incentives in the federal legislative context, see DAVID 
R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 33–38 (1974).  
181. David R. Mayhew makes a similar point and reaches the same conclusion that “minimax 
behavior . . . gives a better fit” for legislators. Id. at 46–47. Note that this analysis glosses over the 
potential dampening effect on electoral competition by, inter alia, district gerrymandering and assumes 
some degree of electoral competitiveness.  
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worry about erroneous convictions (which affect few, if any, electors).182 
Consider the impact of the 1988 “Willie Horton” ad run against candidate 
Michael Dukakis, which implied that the Massachusetts governor’s decisions 
had resulted in 268 first-degree murders.183 Although the actual number was 
zero, the ad “substantially raised the public’s anxiety about Dukakis.”184 
Third, the combination of such legislative risk along with the executive’s 
attitudes to risk may dramatically cabin the domain of feasible coordinated 
bilateral action by the political branches. Some analysts have argued that 
presidents attempt to “reduce . . . political risk by seeking and obtaining the 
approval of another government branch.”185 By allying with Congress, the 
President signals that a given proposal is not the product of idiosyncratic 
preferences or interest-group capture.186 Sharing praise as well as blame, 
presidents dilute both upside and downside risk. As a consequence, they are 
more willing to engage in risky policies with congressional support. But 
Congress seeks to avoid proposals with large downside risk. Precisely when the 
President wants congressional involvement because a proposal is risky, 
legislators will be slow to act. As a result, counterterrorism policies with some 
perceived downside risk are not enacted even if they are on balance beneficial. 
Fourth, when legislators do act, they tend to avoid resolving hard 
questions. In a political system with “many veto players separated by large 
ideological distance . . . legislation can only be incremental.”187 Multiparty 
bargaining delimits the possible policy space for solutions. As the complexity, 
182. Crime panics are also influenced by fear of new migrants, which may also play a role in 
the political dynamics of counterterrorism. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 23 (2011). 
183. GEORGE E. MARCUS ET AL., AFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AND POLITICAL JUDGMENT 4 
(2000). 
184. Id. at 72. In an important and persuasive book, sociologist Katherine Beckett has argued 
that rather than an example of “democracy-at-work,” the late twentieth century politics of crime are a 
result of “political elites—especially politicians and law enforcement personnel” using “mass media to 
disseminate images of the crime and drug problems that imply the need for greater punishment and 
control.” KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICAN POLITICS 11–12 (1997). It is at least worth considering whether a similar dynamic is at 
work in the counterterrorism domain.  
185. Jide O. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation of 
Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 640 (2010). The model 
assumes voters are unsure whether the President is biased away from the popular median. 
Consequently, voters pursue “an asymmetric reward and punishment strategy,” but “assign the primary 
decisionmaker different levels of electoral support depending not only on the ultimate outcome of the 
policy, but also on whether that branch acted unilaterally or with authorization from the other branch.” 
Id. at 621, 623. Executives respond by sharing risk with the legislature, which will “screen out” some 
initiatives. Id. at 644. The model relies on sophisticated voting strategies on the part of the public, 
however, which have yet to be empirically tested.  
186. Id. at 631–33 (noting that their model assumes the probability of capture of each branch is 
independent).  
187. George Tsebelis, Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An 
Empirical Analysis, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 591, 605 (1999). Tsebelis is describing parliamentary 
systems, but the point applies here.  
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difficulty, and enactment costs of legislative specificity rise, legislators will 
tend more and more to delegate decisions rather than to resolve hard questions 
themselves.188 Terrorism is a subject matter that is especially prone to 
legislative delegation because it often entails hard trade-offs. Post-9/11 
legislation generally leaves large discretion in executive hands. For example, 
when fashioning substitutes for habeas corpus, Congress left open both 
substantive and procedural rules.189 While pressing for military commissions in 
2006 and 2009, Congress also left to the executive branch the discretion to 
decide in which cases to use such tribunals. The 2008 tinkering with the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act also left considerable discretion in 
executive hands about how surveillance resources would be deployed.190 
Finally, it is worth underscoring that Congress’s involvement does not 
mean that eventual policy will be more sensitive to values such as individual 
constitutional rights, despite Justice Souter’s argument to that effect.191 At the 
time that the Court happens to dispose of a case, there is no ex ante reason that 
subsequent legislative involvement will necessarily moderate executive 
decisions in ways that favor constitutional rights. Policy outcomes in a veto-
gate system depend on the relative positions of Congress and the executive.192 
If the Supreme Court rejects a liberty-invading innovation by the executive, the 
ensuing statutory response will be less invasive of liberty only if Congress is 
more libertarian than the executive and the courts at the specific time that 
legislators are called on to act. If the executive is more libertarian than 
Congress at that instant, by contrast, judicial resetting of the policy framework 
may well end up producing a less libertarian outcome because it allows 
Congress to reset policy. Yet there is no ex ante reason to predict that Congress 
will always be more libertarian than the executive in this fashion. The relative 
preferences of Congress and the executive depend on the outcomes of recent 
elections. The “cooling” function Justice Souter predicted is thus a contingent 
function of transient politics.193 
188. DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION 
COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 197 (1999). 
189. See Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137, 138–39 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
190. See Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(“The certification required by the FAA must be supported, as appropriate, by the affidavit of any 
appropriate official in the area of national security who is appointed by the President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, or who is the head of an element of the intelligence community.” 
(emphases added)). 
191. See supra Part I.B (discussing Justice Souter’s concurrence in Hamdi). 
192. William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, The Article 1, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 
523, 528–32 (1992). 
193. It is worth noting that Justice Souter’s argument in favor of legislative involvement might 
be recast in slightly different terms. He could be understood to be claiming that splitting decisional 
power between Congress and the President generates more libertarian outcomes because both branches 
must concur in the employment of a coercive power, and it is less likely that both Congress and the 
executive will agree on a policy that raises fundamental liberty concerns. At the very least judicial 
repudiation of unilateral executive action creates frictional resistance against some unwise actions that 
03-Huq (Do Not Delete) 7/29/2012 12:16:28 AM 
924 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:887 
 
In other words, legislative action on terrorism is unlikely to be timely and 
cannot be assumed to have a dampening effect on executive ardor. It is instead 
likely to respond erratically to exogenous pressures and to punt hard questions; 
often, it will be simply unwise. This is hardly the model of Madisonian 
deliberation assumed by the Separation of Powers. 
3. Overseeing Counterterrorism 
A necessary premise of effective legislative action is information, 
especially about how previously enacted laws are being implemented on the 
ground. Congress secures information through its oversight function. Standard 
accounts of generic Congress–executive branch relations identify three 
monitoring mechanisms to this end: procedural deck stacking, private rights of 
action, and close legislative supervision. None, however, function well for 
counterterrorism issues.194 This suggests that Congress’s ability to exercise ex 
post control over security agencies will be minimal. Therefore, to the extent 
Separation of Powers theorists rely on an informed Congress to help solve hard 
questions of counterterrorism regulation, they fail to explain how legislators 
obtain necessary information to act wisely. 
The first possible legislative information-gathering and oversight 
mechanism relies on private actors as instruments of oversight. Congress can 
structure a regulatory process to ensure that favored constituents have a larger 
voice in agency decisions and to tilt agencies toward desired outcomes.195 
Control by ex ante proceduralism, however, is generally overbroad, a scimitar 
and not a scalpel. The 1946 Administrative Procedure Act,196 which applies to a 
plethora of substantive agencies, is criticized as being “too sparse to facilitate 
congressional monitoring.”197 Moreover, procedures can function as frictions 
impinge on constitutional rights. But again, this argument is contingent on transient political dynamics. 
If Congress tends to be less libertarian than the President, it is hard to see how this bilateralism 
requirement could make a difference. It may also be that judicial invalidations trigger public 
backlashes against the courts or draw attention to the absence of government power to extinguish a 
right, which in turn would lead to the enactment of perhaps even more sweeping security measures. 
Over the long term, moreover, constant reminders by courts that the power to eliminate liberties lies 
with legislators may instead accentuate the probability that Congress will act against individual 
liberties. 
194. The analytic arguments developed in this Section are supported by the empirical analysis 
found in AMY B. ZEGART, EYES ON SPIES: CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY 55–84 (2011). 
195. For example, the procedural structure of environmental law around air quality was 
negotiated with an eye to giving particular industrial and environmental groups a stake in agency 
decision making. See Matthew [sic] D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: 
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 442–44, 
468–70 (1989); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political 
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 257–58 (1987) (“Administrative procedures, however, can be used 
to guide agencies to make decisions that are broadly consistent with the policy preferences of political 
principals.”).  
196. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
197. Bressman, supra note 134, at 1771.  
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on desirable agency action as well as avenues for oversight.198 They thus have a 
deregulatory bias, which may have serious unintended consequences in the 
national security domain. 
Even if procedural deck stacking as oversight could work, the generally 
applicable law of administrative procedure is unavailable or weakly 
constraining as applied to security agencies.199 The one constitutionally 
committed form of judicial review, the habeas corpus writ,200 also has much 
less effect than commonly believed in the realm of national security.201 It is 
therefore difficult to see how proceduralism could yield meaningful oversight 
of national security agencies. 
The second option for legislators also relies on private actors. Members of 
Congress can build “fire alarms” for constituents to sound when wronged by 
bureaucrats. Hence, Congress gives private groups standing to challenge 
administrative decisions or otherwise bring agency actions to congressional 
attention.202 Fire alarms have several benefits. They tend to be cost effective; 
they can induce compliance in expectation without being triggered; they are 
“particularistic” in that they allow Congress to home in on specific problems; 
and they externalize search costs onto third parties.203 But fire alarms are an 
incomplete response to information problems in the security domain. Many 
problems in counterterrorism turn on agencies’ ability to assimilate and analyze 
information. No interest group has the necessary access to the intelligence 
community’s counterterrorism analytic process to flag these concerns. 
198. Terry M. Moe, The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC 
CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 455, 468–69 (Dennis C. Muller ed., 1996). 
199. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) excludes “courts martial and military 
commissions” and “military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory.” 5 
U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(F)–(G) (2006); cf. Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 1291, 1294, 1295 n.4 (Ginsburg, 
C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (analyzing status of Guantánamo Combatant Status 
Review Hearings, and concluding that even though they were “sui generis,” they fell outside the 
APA); id. at 1300 n.3, 1301 (Henderson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (reaching the 
same conclusion respecting the APA). Agency action related to national security that is covered by 
APA § 706(2)(A) is subject to “highly deferential standard of review.” Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. 
Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 
F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (similar). Furthermore, federal courts have declined to apply the 
otherwise generally applicable presumption of appellate review with respect to national security 
matters. See Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 526–27 (1988); Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 
197 F.3d 1153, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
200. That remedy, guaranteed by Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, is currently in force 
through 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2256 (2006). 
201. See Huq, supra note 43, at 431 (suggesting that constitutionally compelled habeas has had 
scant effect on national security detention decisions at Guantánamo). For an argument that habeas is 
now also ineffective in other domains, see Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the 
Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 795, 836–37 (2009).  
202. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). 
203. Id. at 172; see also Bressman, supra note 134, at 1769 (“‘[F]ire-alarm’ oversight is 
efficient because it shifts to third-parties the cost of gathering and processing information.”).  
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Problems therefore arise that receive “almost no public attention,” but affect 
“hundreds of billions of dollars” of counterterrorism spending.204 
Litigation is no substitute, for while libertarian interest groups can use 
lawsuits to raise alarms about policies that yield excessive rights violations, 
doctrinal developments have narrowed this route.205 Many counterterrorism 
programs, such as surveillance and racial profiling, cannot be judicially 
challenged under current standing206 or other threshold dismissal doctrines.207 
Finally, Congress can engage in “police patrols” of agencies, which 
involve the “centralized, active, and direct” oversight of agencies by legislators 
themselves.208 In practice, this would mean expending committee time and staff 
resources on monitoring and understanding what agencies do. But police 
patrols, although expensive, often miss violations.209 Additionally, given the 
median member’s attitude to risk, it is unclear what incentive she has to engage 
in such patrols. Even highly salient foreign policy questions “rank low on the 
list of voter concerns” in congressional elections, and in many counterterrorism 
matters, “the public . . . will not know whether Congress takes action or not 
anyway.”210 The history of sua sponte congressional oversight of national 
security affairs indeed suggests that congressional attention to counterterrorism 
will be weaker than in other domains.211 From the early 1950s, for example, 
congressional oversight of the CIA was “sporadic and largely ineffectual.”212 
204. ODOM, supra note 147, at xxix. Odom singles out the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 
responsible for providing the armed services with intelligence, as having numerous management flaws. 
See id. at 94–114 (describing military counterintelligence as “essentially headless”).  
205. See Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 
236–40 (2009) (explaining transubstantive doctrinal developments, which include the reduced 
availability of injunctive relief). 
206. Standing doctrine limits suits against perceived surveillance, see ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 
644, 653 (6th Cir. 2007), and render challenges to discriminatory investigative or policing measures 
difficult to mount, see Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482–83 (1999) 
(rejecting judicial inquiry into selective enforcement in immigration law); City of Los Angeles v. 
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (vacating prospective injunction against discriminatory application of 
policing tactics). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently issued a decision allowing a 
challenge to classified electronic surveillance. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 638 F.3d 118, 122 
(2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, No. 11-1025 (May 21, 2012).  
207. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (rejecting challenge to use of 
material witness detention on qualified immunity grounds); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 564 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (dismissing suit based on insufficiency of allegations and absence of Bivens 
remedy); El-Masri v. Tenet, 479 F.3d 296, 308–11 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissal based on “state secrets” 
doctrine). 
208. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 202, at 166. 
209. Id. at 172.  
210. ZEGART, supra note 194, at 40–41. 
211. See id. at 66–67 (finding “that the Senate Intelligence Committee patrols far less than 
other Senate committees”). 
212. See JEFFREYS-JONES, supra note 93, at 3, 78–80, 126, 157 (“[I]n the 1950s and 1960s 
those responsible for congressional oversight of CIA activities proved languid in the exercise of their 
invigilatory prerogative and duti[es].”); LOCH K. JOHNSON, A SEASON OF INQUIRY: CONGRESS AND 
INTELLIGENCE 6–11 (1988) (describing “failures of congressional oversight” of intelligence more 
generally in the 1960s and 1970s, and ascribing it to “the paralyzing awe engendered by the sheer size 
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Even after events such as the Pearl Harbor attacks, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and 
9/11, “most legislators [tried] to avoid tackling intelligence reform altogether or 
[even sought] to block it.”213 The result was, to be kind, a record of “limited 
success.”214 
In short, the three mechanisms developed by legislators in other policy 
domains to monitor the bureaucracy and keep agency costs in check work 
poorly in the counterterrorism domain. This has implications for executive 
action: without feedback from congressional oversight, it is likely that the 
executive will identify and correct fewer policy errors. Congress’s weak 
oversight capacity thus presents an additional institutional barrier to timely 
reform in response to policy errors or terrorist attacks and more reason to be 
concerned about the possibility of inefficient or ill-tailored policies in general. 
C. Objections 
In response to the arguments developed in this Part, the Separation of 
Powers theorist might acknowledge that the branches are less than ideal. But 
even accepting that the political branches deviate from the paradigms imagined 
in Separation of Powers theory, she might nonetheless try to redeem her theory 
in two ways. 
First, the Separation of Powers theorist might argue that while neither 
branch is optimal, it is nevertheless reasonable to believe that Hamilton and 
Madison accurately captured each branch’s comparative institutional 
advantage. That is, if the executive is incrementally more capable of rapid 
responses than the other branches, and if Congress is incrementally better at 
deliberation than the executive, then Separation of Powers intuitions can stand. 
Indeed, comparative institutional arguments might be extended to argue that 
courts, which are not experts in security policy, should play little role in 
reviewing security matters. 
Even setting aside the theorem of the second best, however, it is far from 
clear that comparative claims (say, that the executive is inevitably better at 
speedy, accurate action, or that the legislature is necessarily better at 
deliberation) are sustainable. Comparative institutional claims of this kind 
and complexity of the intelligence community”); ZEGART, supra note 80, at 41, 213–17; see also id. at 
101–04 (making the same observation for the National Security Council); ZEGART, supra note 98, at 
144–45, 154–55 (noting the same for the FBI even in the 2000s). David Barrett’s historical analysis of 
congressional oversight of the CIA through the Kennedy Administration also found legislative 
deference and coverage gaps, but argues that legislators were periodically “hawkish” on covert action. 
DAVID M. BARRETT, THE CIA AND CONGRESS: THE UNTOLD STORY FROM TRUMAN TO KENNEDY 
458–61 (2005). Zegart notes that congressional oversight is often spurred by covert action that went 
awry, but such oversight generally “did not lead to action.” ZEGART, supra note 80, at 215. And it is 
telling that the most significant congressional investigation of the CIA until the Church Committee 
was led by Joseph McCarthy. See JEFFREYS-JONES, supra, at 74–75.  
213. ZEGART, supra note 98, at 57; accord ODOM, supra note 147 at 1–3. 
214. ZEGART, supra note 194, at 9. 
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demand an empirical foundation. They demand, that is, a thick account of the 
relevant institutions to identify the location of relative advantages. But 
comparative institutional claims of this kind are often offered without any 
detailed, comparative account of the relevant institutions. This Part, by contrast, 
has pursued that empirical inquiry and explored the observed behavior of the 
political branches. It has found little support for the bold comparative 
institutional claims that most often characterize the literature.215 To the 
contrary, empirical inquiry suggests reasons for thinking that agencies often fail 
to respond to new threats for years or even decades, and that legislative 
deliberation will often break down at the first hurdle. Under those 
circumstances, the force of comparative institutional claims is simply unclear 
and there is no way of knowing whether recourse to a strategy of executive 
control or one of bilateralism will yield optimal results in the median case. We 
should thus be cautious in endorsing even these weaker versions of Separation 
of Powers folk wisdom. 
Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that the theorem of the second best 
does not entail that all judicial review should be abandoned. All that is required 
for judicial review of counterterrorism policies to be desirable is the possibility 
that political branch policy choices would be better with ex post judicial 
supervision than without. If courts rely on structural constitutional 
presumptions, judicial review may do little to improve policy outcomes. 
Judicial review will simply ensure a particular policy-making process has been 
followed, even though the choice of policy-making form is uncorrelated with 
desirable outcomes. But if courts instead apply the ordinary tools of legal 
reasoning and factual inquiry to test whether policies conform to statutory and 
constitutional commands, it is plausible to believe that the resulting mix of 
policy outcomes will improve. That is, there is no reason to think “outcomes 
after political process” are worse than “outcomes after political process and 
judicial consideration.” To the contrary, as Part IV develops, there is some 
reason to think policy results improve with judicial review because courts are 
not incapable of identifying some flawed policy outcomes. Nor is there a 
reason to think judicial review is uniquely unwarranted in the security domain, 
because judges in this area are no more likely to be wrong than right. 
A second response to arguments in this Part might proceed as follows. A 
Separation of Powers advocate could acknowledge that each branch is 
suboptimal in the ways I have described, but counter that there are still 
“offsetting violations” of first-best conditions such that her threshold 
215. This may be because claims of comparative institutional competence can be made on the 
basis of either empirical evidence or on the basis of assumptions grounded on eighteenth-century 
Separation of Powers ideals. I suspect that most such claims are in fact claims founded on Separation 
of Powers assumptions rather than empirically inspired arguments. To the extent that comparative 
institutional claims are simply reworkings of the Separation of Powers arguments canvassed in Part I, 
they too are vulnerable to the theorem of the second-best.  
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assumption about institutional competence still leads to the best result.216 That 
is, multiple violations of first-best assumptions counteract each other and net 
out to minimal variance from the optimal. 
The problem with this logic of offsetting is that it is a question of fact 
whether the flaws of Congress and the executive do indeed counteract each 
other in this fashion. There is no ready empirical evidence that they do. There is 
also no a priori reason to believe that observed deficiencies in the branches, 
with different causes and operating in different timeframes, are related in ways 
that make offsetting likely. Of equal importance, the logic of offsetting assumes 
away distortions that affect both branches. But as Part III shows, both branches 
are affected by their political environment in ways that predictably push policy 
outcomes far from the optimal. 
D. Summary 
This Part has argued that both Congress and the executive branch fail to 
live up to the empirical generalizations upon which structural constitutional 
presumptions are based. Rather than unitary actors, Congress and the executive 
are internally heterogeneous, historically contingent entities driven by agencies, 
committees, factions, and bureaucratic interest groups. Arguments for 
executive predominance or congressional involvement that ignore this second-
best reality are unlikely to generate successful predictions about the 
effectiveness of specific institutional arrangements. Consequently, it is not wise 
to use the origins of a policy as a proxy for its wisdom or its conformity to legal 
or constitutional commands. 
III. 
THE EXTERNAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
This Part turns to the branches’ external political environment. It 
examines how that ecosystem impinges on both elected branches to influence 
counterterrorism policy. Its core argument is that, at least when it comes to 
security policy, political pressures predictably move elected officials’ policy 
choices away from what would be optimal. This Part therefore presents 
empirical and theoretical evidence suggesting that public preferences 
systematically push both political branches toward undesirable responses to 
terrorism. Structural constitutionalism contains no resources to address the 
resulting deliberative pathologies. These arguments (which are acute in the 
terrorism context, even if they are also more generally pervasive in politics) 
216. Vermeule, Hume’s Second-Best, supra note 76, at 422, 429 (drawing from Hume the 
lesson that “multiple departures from the optimal or first-best constitutional arrangements might offset 
each other, producing compensating adjustments that ensure constitutional equilibrium”); see also 
Vermeule, Foreword, supra note 76, at 20–23 (giving examples). 
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complement the more general argument developed in Part II. They bite 
particularly on the “bilateralism” strand of Separation of Powers theory. 
I begin by taking as a given that in a democracy elected officials’ policy 
choices are constrained by the preferences of the electorate. Officials cannot 
pursue policy goals absent success at the polls.217 As a consequence, they are 
attentive to voter preferences.218 They constantly engage in “activities related to 
reelection,” including campaign advertising, credit claiming, and casework.219 
Policy selection is also a function of what politicians believe constituents, or at 
least “(politically responsive) interests located within [a] district,”220 desire. 
The resulting force of public pressure applies to both political branches.221 Two 
outcomes flow from this. First, democratic polities mitigate collective action 
costs by delegating powers to elected agents in government. But this in turn 
induces new agency costs that distort policy choices. These agency costs may 
be especially weighty in the counterterrorism context. Second, growing 
empirical evidence suggests that terrorism events induce a cognitive need for 
stability that tugs policy outcomes away from the optimal. If agency costs and 
the electorate’s need for stability push both branches off track, it is unlikely that 
bilateral action, or the initiative of a single branch, will generate consistently 
good policy choices. 
A. Communicating Success in Counterterrorism 
A democratic public cannot act directly in the fashion of ancient Greek 
city-states’ publics because of the high transaction costs of such collective 
action.222 Modern democracies minimize collective action costs by delegating 
217. The canonical statement is MAYHEW, supra note 180, at 16–17. 
218. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 7 (1990) (“I assume that 
when legislators have to make a decision they first ask which alternative contributes more to their 
chances for reelection.”). 
219. MAYHEW, supra note 180, at 49–54. 
220. Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or 
Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 136 (1988) 
(emphasis omitted); accord KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, 
AND INSTITUTIONS 313–14 (1996).  
221. Politicians in both branches are linked by shared membership in political parties; the 
variation of policy preferences among members of the same party may well be smaller than the 
variance among politicians within a single institution. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. 
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2312–16 (2006) (emphasizing 
possibility of convergence in policy preferences of the executive and the legislature during periods of 
unified government). Ex ante it is hard to predict which branch will respond more closely to the 
national median voter. Just as the median legislator in the bicameral Congress might be close or far 
from the national median, so the functionally median voter in the Electoral College, who resides in one 
of a small number of contested states, may be far or close to the national median. Jide Nzelibe, The 
Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1235–39 
(2006). 
222. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS 
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 34 (1965) (analyzing comparative transaction costs of collective action 
for small and large groups). 
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power to central governments. But that delegation induces “agency” costs. That 
is, there are costs associated with the delegation of a task by a principal to an 
agent because of the principal’s imperfect ability to monitor and incentivize the 
agent. Voters have particular difficulty determining whether elected agents are 
applying sufficient effort to achieve voters’ favored policies or have divergent 
preferences. Hence, governments engage in costly efforts to signal their 
credible commitment against terror. The result is a trade-off between 
minimizing collective action costs and mitigating agency costs. The trade-off is 
especially dear in the terrorism context, where a potent signal of credible 
political commitment is the violation of core constitutional rights. 
Agency problems between electors (the principal) and their 
representatives (the agent) persistently arise in democracies.223 The agent will 
not always follow the principal’s preferences out of self-interest, divergent 
preferences, or a simple lack of information or skill. In ordinary contracting, a 
mix of financial incentives and insurance, neither of which are typically 
available in the political context, mitigate the resulting agency costs.224 By 
contrast, the mechanism of ex ante electoral selection effects, in addition to 
retrospective voting (for example, voting on the basis of past performance), 
typically address agency slack between voters and their representatives.225 
The agency problem in counterterrorism is especially acute because voters 
have difficulty assessing competing claims about the efficacy of proposed or 
even past policies.226 That is, it is more difficult in the counterterrorism domain 
than in other policy areas for voters to identify successful policies. Voters do 
not know whether the government is detaining the right people or invading the 
right country because of the government’s functional monopoly on information. 
The most obvious metric of counterterrorism success—attack frequency—is 
untrustworthy because strategic and successful deployment of terrorism will be 
unpredictably distributed through time and space.227 An absence of spectacular 
attacks on the U.S. mainland may indicate counterterrorism success or it may 
suggest al-Qaeda’s determination to exceed the effect of 9/11 with a plan that 
demands a decade or more to execute.228 Successful counterterrorism might 
223. Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
203, 207, 209–10 (2005).  
224. See Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 
10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979). 
225. See TIMOTHY BESLEY, PRINCIPLED AGENTS? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOOD 
GOVERNMENT 105–06 (2006). 
226. For a succinct and elegant account of this agency problem and some examples of 
solutions, see ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 141–50 (2010). For a critical analysis of those solutions, see Aziz Z. Huq, 
Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).  
227. See Claude Berrebi & Darius Lakdawalla, How Does Terrorism Vary Across Space and 
Time? An Analysis Based on the Israeli Experience, 18 DEF. & PEACE ECON. 113, 114, 130 (2007). 
228. POSNER, supra note 108, at 11 (“At most, all that our good fortune in not being attacked 
since 9/11 implies is that the annual probability of a terrorist attack on the United States is low.”).  
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also increase attack frequency in the short term by driving moderates into 
negotiations while empowering the most radical elements of a terrorist 
organization.229 
Nor can voters easily rate officials by how successfully they have tackled 
organizational impediments to successful counterterrorism. Consider the 
question whether the intelligence community should have been reorganized 
after the failures to aggregate and share information before 9/11, and then again 
after the Christmas 2009 airplane bombing attempt.230 Even experts disagree as 
to whether the “net benefit[] of having unified bureaucracies with decreased 
redundancy [is] greater than the net benefits of decentralized, redundant 
delegation.”231 How are voters to judge officials’ claim to resolve this problem 
when experts disagree whether centralization or dispersion is the best 
organizational response?232 
Voters therefore distrust their elected agents and are inclined to withhold 
rewards such as reelection. There are two solutions to this credibility problem: 
(1) investment in observable measures against terror threats and (2) violating 
constitutional rules as a proxy for commitment to addressing the electorate’s 
security concerns. Each separately leads to inefficient resource allocations. 
The first solution involves the prioritization of observable measures taken 
to combat terror threats. Policy responses fall into two categories. Some are 
“specific and publicly observable”; others are “general and not publicly 
observable.”233 For example, in response to the Christmas 2009 attempt, the 
government could have introduced whole-body scanners at airports 
(observable) or recruited more experts in African nations’ cultures (not 
observable). Choosing between observable and non-observable investments, an 
elected official would prefer the former (all things being equal) because it 
better signals a pro-security commitment to voters. Resources thus will flow to 
observable rather than non-observable responses. Hence, the Christmas 2009 
attempt prompted the highly publicized introduction of whole-body scanners 
229. See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist 
Violence, 59 INT’L ORG. 145 (2005) (developing formal model to explain observed increases in 
terrorist violence following concessions by states). 
230. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 161, at 277; WHITE HOUSE REVIEW, supra note 
112, at 4–5.  
231. O’Connell, supra note 106, at 1688.  
232. See RICHARD K. BETTS, ENEMIES OF INTELLIGENCE: KNOWLEDGE & POWER IN 
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 146–50 (2007) (canvassing pros and cons of centralization and 
pluralism); RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE 
WAKE OF 9/11, at 127–62 (2005) (challenging 9/11 Commission’s recommendation of new 
centralization); O’Connell, supra note 106 at 1684–91 (canvassing costs and benefits of centralization 
and dispersion); Joshua Rovner & Austin Long, The Perils of Shallow Theory: Intelligence Reform 
and the 9/11 Commission, 18 INT’L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 609, 610–12 (2005).  
233. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror, 61 
INT’L ORG. 9, 10 (2007).  
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and contrastingly poorly publicized investments in better intelligence 
gathering.234 
This may lead to inefficient allocations of scarce resources. Evidence from 
an analogous context—national disasters—suggests how this problem of 
distorted allocations can arise. A 2009 study of county-level voting behavior 
found voters valued disaster relief only “when . . . expenditures are individually 
targeted, but appear not to value preparedness spending under any 
circumstances.”235 The study concluded that constituency pressure to 
underinvest in precautionary public goods and to overinvest in individuated 
direct benefits decreased “social welfare by billions of dollars.”236 There is no 
reason to believe public responses to terrorism escape that perverse dynamic. 
Why don’t opposition politicians correct the public’s tendency to overrely 
on observable measures? Casual observation reveals few politicians playing 
this virtuous tutelary role. Perhaps voters have no way to sort between 
benevolent tutelary politicians and politicians who simply have different first-
order preferences over security. Or perhaps the heuristics that voters rely upon 
are insufficiently fine grained to permit such sophisticated messaging.237 Even 
assuming voters recognize the risk of distorted investments, they may believe 
the latter an acceptable cost of selecting more committed politicians. 
The second proxy for commitment against terrorism is a politician’s 
willingness to violate constitutional (or statutory) rules. This turns on its head 
an insight from constitutional law, where theorists have posited that 
constitutional rules provide “focal points” for political coordination when 
“cooperation is valuable” and a benchmark is needed.238 The value of 
constitutional rights to an official seeking to communicate a credible security 
commitment is founded on the assumption that the Constitution constrains 
government, and that existing policies almost or entirely fill the constitutionally 
permissible policy space. The only margin on which security might be 
increased, therefore, is through a reduction in rights protection. 
The possibility of using constitutional rights as focal points in this fashion 
is not new. In the criminal procedure context, during his 1968 and 1972 
234. Matthew L. Wald, Airport Efforts to Detect Explosives Expand, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2010, at A16. More attention has, to be sure, been paid to Yemen, but in part this is a consequence of 
political change in that country. See Greg Miller, Yemen Group a Top U.S. Worry; Intelligence 
Officials, in an Annual Terrorism Threat Report, Cite the Offshoot of al Qaeda, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 
2010, at A4. It remains to be seen whether the death of Anwar al-Awlaki, the most visible and publicly 
vilified al-Qaeda figure in Yemen, will lead to a drawdown of attention to that country.  
235. Andrew Healy & Neil Malhotra, Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy, 103 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 387, 389–91, 401 (2009). 
236. Id. at 402. 
237. Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive 
Heuristics in Political Decision Making, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 951, 955 (2001). Less sophisticated voters 
do worse with heuristics than without. Id. at 966–67.  
238. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
910–11 (1996).  
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presidential campaigns, Richard Nixon inveighed against the Warren Court’s 
rulings on criminal procedure and promised to appoint Justices to roll them 
back as a way to show his responsiveness to public concerns about crime.239 
Using constitutional violations as focal points for voters to gauge 
representatives’ responsiveness may be especially attractive when it allows a 
pro-security politician to co-opt political opponents’ advocacy investments. For 
example, criticism from reliably libertarian voices, e.g., the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), “credentializes” a politician because voters can use 
public ACLU opposition as a rough proxy for credible security commitment. 
This effect is available for both Republican and Democrat politicians.240 
Appearing hard on terrorism thus lowers the net expected benefit from 
oppositional mobilization against national security measures, demoralizes those 
measures’ opponents, and slants political competition against libertarian ends. 
Under such conditions, one cannot assume that democratic competition will 
lead to optimal policy choices by either Congress or the executive, or that the 
two political branches’ errors will systematically offset each other. 
In short, agency slack means that democratic accountability does not 
necessarily conduce to the principal’s optimal policy choices. Rather, it is 
likely that a decade of counterterrorism policy, and the billions of dollars 
disbursed in that time, have been spent under systematically distorted 
government incentives.241 
B. Democratic Deliberation and Cognitive Effects of Terrorism 
The empirical evidence of terrorism’s cognitive effects on the general 
public yields more reason to doubt the utility of structural constitutional 
principles. Previous scholarship is sharply divided on the cognitive effect (if 
any) of terror risk. On one side is the claim that the public is “either swept up in 
the frenzy or, at the very least, cowed into submission”242 in terrorism’s wake. 
The claim is often described with arguments from behavioral economics and 
prospect theory about the availability heuristic,243 the tendency to overestimate 
new risks,244 and the amplifying force of “outrage” against an “identifiable 
239. See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 113–16 (2007).  
240. See, e.g., Juan C. Zarate, Obama and Bush: Together on Terror Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
14, 2010, at A11 (invoking ACLU criticism as evidence that Obama is sufficiently pro-security). 
241. See also PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 140, at xviii (“[The] nation . . . ha[s] shelled out 
hundreds of billions of dollars to turn the machine of government over to defeating terrorism without 
ever really questioning what they were getting for their money.”). 
242. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION 
ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 536 (2004).  
243. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The Availability Heuristic 
and Cross-Cultural Risk Perceptions, 57 ALA. L. REV. 75, 87 (2005) (“If people can easily think of 
such examples, they are far more likely to be frightened than if they cannot.”). 
244. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 23 (2007) (discussing cognitive effects 
when “risks . . . suddenly come ‘on screen,’ making people believe that where they once were safe, 
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perpetrator.”245 On the other side is the view that any “security panic” after a 
terrorist attack reflects only rational updating based on new information,246 and, 
even if overwrought, will be counterbalanced by a “libertarian panic” induced 
by overestimation of “the risk that government will impose excessive security 
measures.”247 The choice between these positions is ultimately “empirical, and 
cannot be resolved through a priori reasoning.”248 But increasing empirical 
evidence—none of which has been examined in the legal scholarship—
suggests that terrorism has cognitive effects, that shifts in public attitudes 
cannot be explained by informational updating, and that these effects do not 
leave public preferences in a desirable equilibrium. There are two relevant 
bodies of research: one involving experimental studies, and the other 
population-level studies. This Section addresses each in turn. 
1. Motivated Social Cognition and Terrorism 
Political psychologists seeking to explain public responses have 
developed a theory of “motivated social cognition.”249 Research in “terror 
management theory” (TMT) suggests that a person’s understanding of the 
world does not only have an informational function. It also “serve[s] the 
existential function of allowing people to symbolically transcend the threat 
induced by the uniquely human awareness of one’s own mortality.”250 
Experimental studies in the TMT tradition demonstrate that stimulating 
awareness of mortality induces a heightened desire to experience control.251 
Further, some of those studies suggest that “highly threatening situations are 
frequently (but not always) associated with ideological shifts to the right.”252 
they are now unsafe”); Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 MO. L. REV. 903, 928–29 
(2004). 
245. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate 
Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 507 (2007). 
246. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 23, at 64–65. 
247. Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Panics, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 873 (2005) [hereinafter 
Vermeule, Libertarian Panics] (noting further that distorting information cascades may also go in 
either direction); see also POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 23, at 78–80 (chronicling “libertarian 
panics” during colonial America and after the terrorist attacks of 9/11).  
248. Vermeule, Libertarian Panics, supra note 247, at 884. But cf. id. at 888 (stressing the 
possibility that “panicky libertarians are especially likely to diagnose security panics” and “those who 
are most prone to accuse others of panicking are themselves most firmly in the grip of the irrational”). 
249. Dana R. Carney et al., The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality 
Profiles, Interaction Styles, and the Things They Leave Behind, 29 POL. PSYCHOL. 807, 807 (2008).  
250. John T. Jost et al., Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities, 60 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 307, 320 (2009). For a detailed discussion of TMT and the social science 
research supporting the thesis, see TOM A. PYSZCZYNSKI ET AL., IN THE WAKE OF 9/11: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR 27–28, 37–80 (2003); Sheldon Solomon et al., The Cultural Animal: 
Twenty Years of Terror Management Theory and Research, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL 
EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY 13 (Jeff Greenberg et al. eds., 2004).  
251. See Immo Fritsche et al., The Role of Control Motivation in Mortality Salience Effects on 
Ingroup Support and Defense, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 524, 525–26 (2008). 
252. Jost et al., supra note 250, at 321. 
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Mortal threats also induce “a temporary increase in closed-mindedness” and 
“an affinity for . . . certainty-oriented . . . policies and opinions.”253 This 
manifests as revised attitudes toward in-groups and out-groups254 based on 
stereotypes that conduce to an “orderly, meaningful conception of reality 
necessary to protect people from deeply rooted existential fear.”255 Sociotropic 
threats have larger effects than personal ones.256 These effects are robust across 
the political spectrum; they are found among Democrats and Republicans 
alike.257 
These are general findings about mortality salience. Is there evidence they 
extend to terrorism in particular? After 9/11, many psychologists turned to 
study terrorism’s cognitive effects on individuals. Their results confirm TMT’s 
application to terrorism.258 They also reject the thesis implied by earlier studies 
of social diversity259 that people tend to polarize toward opposite ideological 
poles, such that variance in ideological differences within the public may 
increase, but that there is no net change in median preferences.260 
Evidence for TMT’s application to terrorism derives from experimental 
studies in which control and treatment groups’ preferences over candidates and 
policies are measured after the treatment group has been exposed to terrorism-
related mortality reminders. Four studies are worth reporting. The first, 
conducted before the 2004 presidential election, found terrorism-related 
mortality reminders increased support for George W. Bush over John Kerry 
253. Id.  
254. Jeff Schimel et al., Stereotypes and Terror Management: Evidence That Mortality 
Salience Enhances Stereotypic Thinking and Preferences, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 905, 
906 (1999); see also Jennifer Crocker & Riia Luhtanen, Collective Self-Esteem and Ingroup Bias, 58 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 60 (1990) (identifying a trait of “collective self-esteem” that predicts 
a tendency to derogate out-groups). 
255. Schimel et al., supra note 254, at 922.  
256. DARREN W. DAVIS, NEGATIVE LIBERTY: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE TERRORIST 
ATTACKS ON AMERICA 77–78 (2007). 
257. See generally George A. Bonanno & John T. Jost, Conservative Shift Among High-
Exposure Survivors of the September 11th Terrorist Attacks, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 311 
(2006) (finding a conservative shift in Democratic, Republican, and Independent survivors of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks).  
258. For summaries of the field, see Mark Dechesne & Arie W. Kruglanski, Terror’s Epistemic 
Consequences: Existential Threats and the Quest for Certainty and Closure, in HANDBOOK OF 
EXPERIMENTAL EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 250, at 247, 259–60 (“[T]hreats of terror can 
culminate in ethnocentrism, outgroup derogation, and social judgments based on stereotypes . . . [due 
to] people’s general increased need for firmness in judgment and beliefs.”); Johannes Ullrich & J. 
Christopher Cohrs, Terrorism Salience Increases System Justification: Experimental Evidence, 20 
SOC. JUST. RES. 117 (2007).  
259. See KAREN STENNER, THE AUTHORITARIAN DYNAMIC 60–61 (2005).  
260. See John T. Jost et al., Are Needs to Manage Uncertainty and Threat Associated with 
Political Conservatism or Ideological Extremity?, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 989, 
995–96 (2007). This study used reminders of terrorism as a means of provoking death anxiety, and 
specifically addressed the possibility of bilateral movement to different extremes. Id. at 993, 1004 
(“[W]e found that uncertainty and threat management contribute independently to self-reported 
political conservativism, even after adjusting for ideological extremity.”). 
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among both liberals and conservatives, independent of rational Bayesian 
updating based on new information.261 A second 2004 study found “registered 
voters . . . reported intending to vote for Senator John Kerry by a huge margin 
in psychologically benign conditions, but favored Bush after a mortality 
salience induction.”262 Similar to the first study, experimental subjects were not 
supplied with new information about the candidates, which might have 
otherwise confounded the results of the study. The third study found that 
exposure to terrorism-related material led subjects to view President Bush as 
more charismatic and less blameworthy for policy failures on his watch.263 
More pertinent here, it also identified a positive effect for state-level politicians 
(for example, governors), who typically have few terrorism-related 
responsibilities.264 The study found that subjects felt “particularly compelled to 
protect a given leader against accusations of wrongdoing” under conditions of 
terrorist threat.265 In other words, threat induced the suppression of evidence 
inconsistent with a preference for a strong leader. The fourth study analyzed 
cross-sectional national polling data from 2000, 2002, and 2004. It found that 
positive feelings toward diverse out-groups, both with and without affective 
connections to terrorism (e.g., both immigrants and homosexuals), “decrease in 
the face of terrorist threat.”266 This study is significant because it is not 
vulnerable to the external validity critiques to which studies conducted with 
university students are often subjected. 
All four studies illustrate the effect of terrorism on preferences, even after 
controlling for the effect of new information. This last aspect of the studies 
merits emphasis. It might be thought that shifts in public preferences over the 
261. Mark J. Landau et al., Deliver Us from Evil: The Effects of Mortality Salience and 
Reminders of 9/11 on Support for President George W. Bush, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 1136, 1146 (2004). For similar results in parallel experiments, see Florette Cohen et al., 
American Roulette: The Effect of Reminders of Death on Support for George W. Bush in the 2004 
Presidential Election, 5 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 177, 183–85 (2005); Matthew T. 
Gailliot et al., Self-Regulatory Processes Defend Against the Threat of Death: Effects of Self-Control 
Depletion and Trait Self-Control on Thoughts and Fears of Dying, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 49 (2006); cf. Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of 
Terrorism: A National Field Experiment, 14 PSYCH. SCI. 144 (2003) (finding fear and anger have 
different effects on risk perceptions).  
262. Cohen et al., supra note 261, at 183. 
263. JENNIFER L. MEROLLA & ELIZABETH J. ZECHMEISTER, DEMOCRACY AT RISK: HOW 
TERRORIST THREATS AFFECT THE PUBLIC 131, 140 (2009).  
264. Id. at 106–07, 116–17. 
265. Id. at 142. That the same result from terror was found among Mexican test subjects with 
respect to Mexican political leaders suggests again that rational updating is not at work. Id. at 152–53.  
266. Id. at 83. A pair of studies conducted in parallel in Canada and the United States 
immediately after 9/11 found correlations between threat perceptions and reduced support for 
immigration in both countries. Gordon Hodson et al., Perceptions of Threat, National Representation, 
and Support for Procedures to Protect the National Group, in COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S WAR ON TERRORISM 109, 116–22 (Paul R. Kimmel 
& Chris E. Stout eds., 2006) (finding “reciprocal and often reinforcing” interactions between threat 
perceptions and in-group solidarity). 
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past decade are best explained by the simple fact that a terrorist event provides 
observers with new information about the world. When controlling for this 
possibility, these studies isolate distortive cognitive effects that are independent 
of empirical updating. The third study additionally demonstrates that motivated 
cognitive responses to terrorism may dampen the processing of negative 
information about leaders in ways that leave incompetent or ill-intentioned 
leaders in place. And the final study suggests that judgments about in-groups 
and out-groups of all kinds change as terrorism risk perceptions change. 
In the aggregate, this research demonstrates that the public will demand a 
policy response to terrorism based not merely on new information about risk, 
but also based on a cognitive tendency to weigh terrorism risk heavily. They 
will also suppress information about the government’s failures and impose 
superfluous burdens on disfavored out-groups. 
A second line of experiments tests how exposure to terror or threat affects 
people’s normative judgments. It confirms that terrorism does not merely drive 
people to take more extreme versions of prior positions but pushes all toward 
pro-security policies. This research uses a concept of “authoritarianism,” which 
is defined to include a predisposition to submit to authority and to prefer 
“moral absolutism and conformity”; intolerance and castigation of dissidents 
and deviants; and animosity and aggression toward racial and ethnic out-
groups.267 Consider a 2006 authoritarianism study of national cross-sectional 
data from the Cooperative Congressional Study.268 The sample was divided by 
degree of perceived threat. Among those who did not see terrorism as a 
significant threat, there was a significant gap in preferences between 
authoritarians and nonauthoritarians. Among those who did see a large threat, 
the gap narrowed: nonauthoritarians’ preferences moved toward those of 
authoritarians.269 Under conditions of perceived threat, nonauthoritarians and 
authoritarians converged on a preference for military force over diplomacy.270 
Terrorism’s effect on political psychology also appears to be asymmetric in the 
sense that it affects those with different normative priors in different ways.271 
267. STENNER, supra note 259, at 3, 14–15; see also MARC J. HETHERINGTON & JONATHAN 
D. WEILER, AUTHORIZATION & POLARIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 33, 38–39 (2009) (reporting 
survey data to the same effect).  
268. For more details on this national public opinion survey that focused on the public’s views 
of their federal legislative representatives, see New Data Source on Congressional Elections, 
COOPERATIVE CONG. ELECTION STUDY (Sept. 22, 2011), http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces/ 
announcements/new-data-source-congressional-elections.  
269. HETHERINGTON & WEILER, supra note 267, at 123–27.  
270. Id. at 127–29. 
271. In an important article, Professor Vermeule reviews two TMT studies and finds 
“ambiguous results to date.” Adrian Vermeule, Emergency Lawmaking After 9/11 and 7/7, 75 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1155, 1168 (2008). He suggests that because mortality salience “causes stricter adherence to 
one’s antecedent worldview” it will merely reinforce the conservative views of those with conservative 
priors and reinforce the libertarian views of those who favored rights ex ante. Id. The result is 
“simultaneous and countervailing political effects.” Id. at 1167 (emphasis added).  
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In sum, recent empirical work demonstrates that terrorism triggers a need 
for increased security, predictability, and control. This induces voters across the 
political spectrum to tilt toward “resistance to change and opposition to 
equality, which reduce uncertainty and threat.”272 Such biasing effect is not 
transmitted via briefly experienced emotion, but follows from a change in 
underlying cognitive demands.273 The TMT research thus suggests that 
incidents of terrorism can have enduring cognitive consequences. Although 
experiments have not yet provided a satisfactory account of the temporal 
dimensions of cognitive change, one study found that the effects of 9/11 on 
It is not clear, however, that either of the studies that are cited in Emergency Lawmaking After 
9/11 and 7/7 supports this conclusion. First, Professor Vermeule cites a 1992 experimental study that 
found reminders of mortality made conservatives “more favorable” to another conservative subject and 
“more unfavorable” toward a liberal subject. Jeff Greenberg et al., Terror Management and Tolerance: 
Does Mortality Salience Always Intensify Negative Reactions to Others Who Threaten One’s 
Worldview?, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 212, 215 (1992). By contrast, liberals did not 
become more favorable to liberals and “became less unfavorable” toward conservatives. Id. This is not 
a finding of countervailing effects. Rather, “both the conservatives and the liberals became more 
favorable to the conservative target.” Id. The finding is consonant with other studies. See Landau et al., 
supra note 261, at 1146 (“[T]he increased appeal of President Bush in response to reminders of death 
or the events of 9/11 was not at all limited to conservative individuals and was not the result of an 
increase in political conservatism.”); Cohen et al., supra note 261, at 183 (finding a 400 percent 
increase in votes for Bush over Kerry). In addition, the Greenberg study suggests that even liberals will 
be more hostile to perceived out-groups. The study authors caution that “liberal ideology is also rooted 
in fundamental American and Judeo-Christian ideals.” Greenberg et al., supra, at 216. Those not 
perceived as “American and Judeo-Christian” may be seen as outsiders across the political spectrum. 
Id.; see also Schimel et al., supra note 254, at 909–10 (finding increased aversion to non-Americans). 
In short, the Greenberg study does not support the countervailing effects thesis. 
The second cited study found that reminders of 9/11 increased support for “extreme military 
interventions . . . and the Patriot Act” among conservatives and “had no effect . . . among politically 
liberal Americans.” Tom Pyszczynski et al., Mortality Salience, Martyrdom, and Military Might: The 
Great Satan Versus the Axis of Evil, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 525, 533 (2006). 
Again, this is not a finding of countervailing effects: it is a finding that the strength of conservatives’ 
preferences for force increases while that of liberals remains constant. To have an offsetting effect, 
liberals would have to become less supportive of force. The study’s authors explicitly reject the 
countervailing effects theory: 
It seems clear that reminders of mortality do not simply lead to an amplification of 
tendencies that exist under more neutral conditions. Rather [mortality salience] leads 
people to gravitate toward conceptions of reality that provide security . . . . Often this entails 
affirming the dominant aspects of one’s worldview, but as the present and other results 
demonstrate, sometimes this entails moving toward less dominant aspects of the worldview 
that are heavily associated with feelings of superiority, structure, and security. 
Id. at 536 (emphasis added); see also Jost et al., supra note 260, at 1004 (rejecting the hypothesis that 
threat is “associated with ideological extremity in general” and finding instead “that uncertainty and 
threat management contribute independently to self-reported political conservatism, even after 
adjusting for ideological extremity”). Other studies do find liberals moving toward a liberal extreme—
but not in the United States. See Jacqueline M. Anson et al., Political Ideology in the 21st Century: A 
Terror Management Perspective on Maintenance and Change of the Status Quo, in SOCIAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF IDEOLOGY AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION 210, 223 (John T. Jost et al. eds., 
2009) (citing unpublished study of French subjects).  
272. Jost et al., supra note 260, at 990; accord John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism as 
Motivated Social Cognition, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 339, 366 (2003).  
273. See Landau et al., supra note 261, at 1137. 
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attitudes towards civil liberties lingered five years after the event.274 Other 
experimental TMT studies have found significant effects in responses to 
questions about terrorism years after 9/11.275 Thus, it might be posited that the 
operative cognitive mechanism is not a short-term response akin to quotidian 
fear or panic, but a more enduring species of cognitive transformation. 
2. Election-Level Studies of Terrorism’s Effects 
Empirical evidence from Israel, the United States, Mexico, and Spain 
confirm the significance of socially motivated cognition effects that have been 
identified in the aforementioned individual-level studies. Terrorism influences 
electoral results in ways that cannot be explained by new information about the 
competence of a ruling administration or novel risk information. 
Time-series studies suggest terrorism has a predictable cross-national 
effect on election outcomes. The best data comes from Israel, where experience 
with terrorism is unfortunately frequent enough to allow relatively precise 
measurement of its interactions with democratic processes.276 The best 
available study uses Israeli parliamentary elections between 1988 and 2003. It 
found that a terrorist attack in a locality “causes roughly an increase of 1.35 
percentage points for the right bloc,” independent of whether a right- or left-
government had been in office during the attack.277 Left-leaning constituencies 
also become more right-leaning when attacks occur within those 
constituencies.278 By contrast, left and right blocs in localities that do not suffer 
attacks polarize.279 That is, there is in those localities movement to both left and 
right extremes depending on whether they are left- or right-leaning 
respectively. The net effect of all these shifts is “an increase in the electorate’s 
support for the bloc of parties that is associated with a more intransigent 
position toward terrorism.”280 A second study of election outcomes between 
1990 and 2003 confirmed this pro-security swing.281 
Similar effects can be found in the U.S. election data. Since presidential 
campaigns are infrequent, highly competitive, and based on bundled judgments 
274. See ADAM J. BERINSKY, IN TIME OF WAR: UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN PUBLIC 
OPINION FROM WORLD WAR II TO IRAQ 166–68 (2009). 
275. See, e.g., Jost et al., supra note 260, at 993. 
276. See Seymour Spilerman & Guy Stecklov, Societal Responses to Terrorist Attacks, 35 
ANN. REV. SOC. 167, 178 (2009) (describing measures taken by the Israeli government in response to 
chronic terrorism).  
277. Claude Berrebi & Esteban F. Klor, Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence 
from the Israeli Electorate, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 279, 287–88 (2008).  
278. See id. at 292. 
279. Id. at 293.  
280. Id. at 299. Note that this is a rational strategy of an extreme faction within a given political 
movement seeking to peel followers away from a more moderate faction by forcing the hand of an 
opponent toward violence.  
281. See Claude Berrebi & Esteban F. Klor, On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory 
and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 899, 919 (2006). 
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about variegated policy issues, the discrete effect of terrorism is confounded 
and hard to isolate. Experimental studies and cross-sectional analyses can 
nonetheless identify some of terrorism’s effects on voter preferences. Easiest to 
observe is the “rally-round-the-flag” effect favoring incumbent executives.282 
President Bush’s approval ratings thus leapt from 51% on September 10 to 86% 
on September 15, 2001.283 The “rally effect” diminished over time.284 Some 
analysts argue nevertheless that the effect persisted into the 2002 and 2004 
races, which saw significant gains for the Republican Party and fewer high-
quality Democratic candidates running.285 
While rally effects appear on first blush to be independent of the public’s 
retroactive assessments of an elected official’s competence or achievements,286 
they are amenable to both ‘rational’ and ‘socially motivated cognition’ 
explanations. On the one hand, it could be argued that whether or not it is truly 
deserved, the rally effect lowers political transaction costs for governmental 
adaptations to new risk. Hence, a rally renders rapid and controversial state 
responses to new threats less costly. On the other hand, rally effects are also 
consistent with TMT’s prediction that threat perceptions induce increased 
attachment to in-group symbols (i.e., the presidency), with the net effect of 
facilitating distorted and undesirable policy outcomes.287 
Rally effects wane over time. But they still have potentially perverse 
medium-term consequences. Suppose that a political leader is properly at fault 
for some failure of organization or response to a terror attack, or that she 
exploits the attack as an opportunity to pursue agendas unrelated to security. 
Because increased support for a political leader is correlated with unwillingness 
to blame that leader,288 negative information about her failure that emerges 
during the rally’s duration may be discounted and perhaps never acted upon. 
The leader thus ex ante has less incentive to avoid or correct policy errors. 
282. Marc J. Hetherington & Michael Nelson, Anatomy of a Rally Effect: George W. Bush and 
the War on Terrorism, 36 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 37 (2003). Further evidence of how responses to 
disaster are shaped by extant partisan affiliations is supplied by Neil Malhotra & Alexander G. Kuo, 
Attributing Blame: The Public’s Response to Hurricane Katrina, 70 J. POL. 1, 9–14 (2007); see also 
Neil Malhotra, Partisan Polarization and Blame Attribution in a Federal System: The Case of 
Hurricane Katrina, 38 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 651, 656 (2008) (“In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, 
there was significant partisan division with respect to which government figures deserved the most 
blame.”).  
283. Hetherington & Nelson, supra note 282, at 37. 
284. See Cindy D. Kam & Jennifer M. Ramos, Joining and Leaving the Rally: Understanding 
the Surge and Decline in Presidential Approval Following 9/11, 72 PUB. OP. Q. 619, 628–30, 637 
(2008). 
285. See Gary C. Jacobson, Terror, Terrain, and Turnout: Explaining the 2002 Midterm 
Elections, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 4–5 (2002); see also James E. Campbell, Why Bush Won the 
Presidential Election of 2004: Incumbency, Ideology, Terrorism, and Turnout, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 219, 
225–26 (2005) (discussing effect of national security issues on 2004 election outcomes). 
286. See Berrebi & Klor, supra note 277, at 291 & tbl.8 (“[T]he electoral effect of a terror 
fatality is not affected by the identity of the party holding office.”). 
287. See Kam & Ramos, supra note 284, at 621, 641. 
288. MEROLLA & ZECHMEISTER, supra note 263, at 142. 
03-Huq (Do Not Delete) 7/29/2012 12:16:28 AM 
942 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:887 
 
Rally effects, in short, can be impediments to both precautions and post hoc 
course corrections even if they facilitate new responses to new security risks. 
Moreover, macro studies find postterror spikes in preferences for in-
groups as well as disfavor directed at out-groups.289 One study, for instance, 
investigated “ethnocentrism” in post-9/11 political data. “Ethnocentrism” is 
defined in that study as “a predisposition to divide the human world into in-
groups and out-groups.”290 It is measured by assessing the strength of 
stereotyping beliefs or in-group preferences/out-group hostility.291 Based on a 
series of multiple regressions of 2002 policy preference data that used 2000 
ethnocentrism data as an independent variable, the study found a “statistically 
significant and substantively sizable” correlation between those 2000 
ethnocentric preferences and 2002 policy views, even after controlling for 
conservativism, threat perceptions, authoritarian predispositions, and 
demographics.292 A second study found authoritarian predispositions to 
influence threat perceptions after controlling for demographics, partisanship, 
and both temporal and geographic distance from 9/11.293 A third cross-sectional 
study of Canadian and American attitudes towards pandemic and terrorism 
risks identified “nationality-based collective self-esteem” as a statistically 
significant predictor of people’s evaluations of terrorism risk, but not the risk 
from pandemics.294 That is, in each of these studies some kind of in-group 
preference influenced either the perception of terrorism risk magnitude or 
preferences between different security-related policies. 
It bears emphasis that rational updating based on new information cannot 
easily explain the pattern of changes in American attitudes to terrorism before 
and after 9/11. By September 2001, Americans had already been exposed to the 
risk of catastrophic domestic terrorism by the 1993 World Trade Center attack 
and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Both of these events signaled at least 
the possibility of mass casualties. One prefigured the site of 9/11. In response 
to Oklahoma City, Congress even enacted major antiterrorism legislation in 
289. For some evidence of rational updating as well, see Darren W. Davis & Brian D. Silver, 
Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America, 48 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 28, 35–36 (2004) (reporting statistically significant decline in support for civil liberties 
correlating with perceptions of sociotropic threat). By in-groups, I mean communities with which a 
person identifies on, say, religious, racial, or national grounds. 
290. DONALD R. KINDER & CINDY D. KAM, US AGAINST THEM: ETHNOCENTRIC 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN OPINION 31, 44–52 (2009). 
291. Id.  
292. Id. at 83, 81–89; see also Cindy D. Kam & Donald R. Kinder, Terror and Ethnocentrism: 
Foundations of American Support for the War on Terrorism, 69 J. POL. 320, 328 (2007) (providing 
evidence to the same effect).  
293. See Leonie Huddy et al., Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies, 49 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 593, 599 (2005). 
294. Neal Feigenson et al., Perceptions of Terrorism and Disease Risks: A Cross-National 
Comparison, 69 MO. L. REV. 991, 995 (2004). The study broadly confirms the ‘security panic’ thesis. 
It identified overevaluation of terrorism risk and found that both fear and anger were “correlated with 
increased perceptions of risk to both self and others.” Id. at 996–97, 1003.  
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1996.295 And after the highly publicized 1998 attacks on African embassies and 
the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Aden, al-Qaeda became known to the U.S. 
public. In short, the public had ample reason to be concerned about terrorism 
before 9/11. To explain post-9/11 changes in policy preferences as pure rational 
updating implies that Americans did not update at all based on pre-9/11 events 
such as the USS Cole bombing and the 1993 World Trade Center attacks, but 
then had a precisely calibrated response to 9/11.296 This combination of “hot 
irrationality then” and “cold rationality now” is implausible. 
Furthermore, distaste for out-groups is not a merely abstract possibility. 
Levels of animus directed at out-groups perceived as being especially 
responsible for terrorism risk—i.e., Muslims, South Asians, and Middle 
Easterners—has risen since 2009 in the United States after falling from a post-
9/11 peak.297 Reported levels of employment discrimination and bias attacks 
have increased at a similar rate.298 A “steady drip” of pejorative images of 
Muslims remains “a serious and ongoing feature of contemporary life.”299 TMT 
theory not only explains these trends, but also supplies a reason for explaining 
why it is that policy makers and the public seem to be slow to perceive in them 
a problem worth addressing. 
These findings, in sum, demonstrate that a democratic public will 
systematically impose pressure on its elected representatives in both Congress 
and the White House to adopt inefficient policies, to suppress the mistakes of 
national leaders, and to target out-groups for harsh treatment. To the extent that 
the Separation of Powers is offered as a response to these problems, it will fail. 
C. Summary 
This Part has argued that the external environment of democratic politics 
does not conduce to optimal responses to terrorism because of collective action 
problems, agency costs, and the disequilibrating effect of socially motivated 
cognition. Such powerful forces buffet both elected branches alike. The 
Separation of Powers, conceived as an endorsement of bilateralism, provides no 
solution to any of these external distortions. The arguments developed in this 
Part also supply a reason why structural constitutional presumptions cannot be 
295. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.). 
296. The “rational updating” explanation cannot be redeemed by arguing that pre-2001 
incidents were lower profile: the basic assumption of rational explanations is that even lower profile 
events influence expectations of terrorist violence at the margin in a way that yields net rational 
responses.  
297. See Aziz Z. Huq, Private Religious Discrimination, National Security, and the First 
Amendment, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 350–57 (2011) (collecting data showing trends in 
discrimination and examining possible explanations).  
298. Id. at 351–52. 
299. PETER MOREY & AMINA YAQIN, FRAMING MUSLIMS: STEREOTYPING AND 
REPRESENTATION AFTER 9/11, at 208 (2011). 
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repackaged as merely comparative claims of institutional competence.300 When 
the political branches err, they will often do so in lockstep as a consequence of 
exogenous forces. There is thus no reason to think that one branch will 
systematically do better than the other, or that joint political branch action will 
be optimal given the distortive effect of political psychology. 
The claim developed in this Part should not be overstated. I am not 
contending that there is an entity other than Congress or the executive branch 
that is best suited to determine or execute security policy. Policy responses 
necessarily will involve actors within one or both branches. My narrow claim 
here is rather that when it comes to the exercise of otherwise proper judicial 
review, presumptions founded on an idealized theory of the Separation of 
Powers will be systematically inadequate as proxies for the soundness of 
counterterrorism policy making. That is, there is no panacea in the writings of 
Hamilton or Madison to the serious and difficult problems of responding to 
threats such as al-Qaeda today. 
IV. 
ADJUDICATION WITHOUT STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTIONS 
In Parts II and III, I have challenged the judicial use of structural 
constitutional presumptions as heuristics in counterterrorism cases. I have 
offered evidence that the logic of structural constitutionalism fails to account 
for two significant complicating factors: (1) the internal structures of each 
political branch, and (2) the external political environment that predictably 
distorts both of the political branches’ choices. Bringing the internal and 
external ecologies of political action back into the picture casts doubt on the 
empirical generalizations that underwrite commonly used structural 
constitutional presumptions. As a result, it is not safe to assume that a policy 
option is effective and appropriately targeted within the bounds of statutory 
authority simply because it has the executive’s imprimatur. Nor is it plausible 
to assume that policies close to the optimum are necessarily achieved simply by 
insisting on bilateral consideration and endorsement by the two political 
branches. In our second-best world, neither of the heuristics drawn from 
eighteenth-century ideas about the Separation of Powers is a reliable guide. 
Neither is sufficiently sensitive to the effects of today’s internal institutional 
fragmentation and external political distortion. 
But if federal judges should not rely on the Separation of Powers as a 
crutch for thinking about hard questions of statutory meaning and individual 
rights, how should they resolve hard cases involving counterterrorism policy? 
Put simply, they should decide counterterrorism cases using the ordinary tools 
of legal reasoning and fact finding. 
300. See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 23, at 30–31. 
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As a threshold matter, it is worth stressing how the context of adjudication 
inflects the analysis. Courts are almost never first movers in making policy. 
Rather, they review discrete actions for their compliance with statutory or 
constitutional commands based on both the evidentiary record developed in a 
specific case at hand and also the larger factual record developed by the 
government in enacting the policy. To the extent federal judges fashion 
constitutional rules on a moving-forward basis through adjudication, they do so 
only after being informed by the briefing of all concerned parties (including the 
government) and with the benefit of some evidence of how a policy works on 
the ground. That is, in those instances in which adjudication produces a 
downstream effect on the primary conduct rules limiting government action, 
the government has almost always been heavily involved in shaping that 
litigation by determining the larger policy environment (e.g., by deciding 
whether or not to seek legislative support), by informing (or propagandizing) 
the public, and by educating the courts through its briefs and verbal 
presentations. 
Taking the use of structural constitutional presumptions off the table does 
not change any of these elementary parameters of adjudication. Rather, it 
means that courts will look directly at the relationship between the facts 
generated by the government in a given case and the applicable statutory or 
constitutional command. In so doing, the evidentiary records and policy 
arguments developed by Congress and the executive necessarily assume large 
relevance. Hence, it will almost always be the case that the executive will have 
an opportunity to leverage its expertise and insight both directly in briefing the 
case and indirectly in setting the judicial agenda. 
In the course of adjudication, the court should engage in a familiar pattern 
of fact finding and legal reasoning to ascertain whether a policy is justified and 
compatible with applicable legal norms. It should not ask whether the right 
branch(es) was (or were) involved as a heuristic for resolving the case. At the 
end of the day, it is quite plausible to think the ordinary process of litigation, 
informed by the government and its adversaries, is more likely to yield a 
correct answer to legal questions than the abbreviating punctuation of a 
structural constitutional presumption. In other words, the addition of after-the-
fact judicial supervision will plausibly generate superior outcomes to 
government action without such ex post supervision in cases that are otherwise 
within the proper jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
To be more concrete, it may help to examine what this would this mean in 
the cases delineated in Part I. Start with the HLP case in which the Court 
upheld the application of the material support law to speech acts that on their 
face implicated no risk of violence.301 In that case, the Court would have 
301. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 30–37. 
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evaluated the conformity of the material support statute with the First 
Amendment without a presumption of executive competence. That is, it would 
use the ordinary tools of judicial inquiry pursuant to the First Amendment to 
reach a judgment on this question. Applying strict scrutiny, and without a 
structural constitutional crutch, it is plausible to think that the Court would 
have had to strike down some applications of the material support provision on 
First Amendment grounds. 
But there is no reason to think a retreat from structural presumptions 
would always disadvantage the government. In a case such as Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld,302 for example, the Court would examine the question of statutory 
authorization for military commissions without any particular presumption 
either for or against the government. That is, it would examine the statutory 
question there without stacking the deck with a clear statement rule favoring 
legislative involvement. Ordinary principles of statutory interpretation would 
drive the analysis, just as they do whenever the executive argues in any other 
area of law that a regulation or policy falls within the permissible scope of an 
existing statute.303 There should be no thumb on the scales in favor of either 
more or less deference to the executive than would ordinarily be the case.304 It 
is quite plausible to think that the outcome of Hamdan would have been 
different under those conditions. 
Similarly, in the two “enemy combatant” detention cases discussed in Part 
I, Munaf 305 and Hamdi,306 the Court would resolve the statutory and individual 
rights questions relating to detention authority at issue without a bias in favor 
of executive competence or the need for bilateralism. In Hamdi, this would rule 
out Justice Souter’s argument that the executive’s position on a statute required 
especially clear proof of congressional endorsement. In Munaf, it would mean 
that structural constitutional presumptions would likely not entirely oust the 
factual review normally at the heart of the Great Writ. Whether this would 
result in a judgment against the executive in Munaf is, of course, something 
302. 548 U.S. 557 (2006); see supra text accompanying notes 65–70. 
303. Debates about the appropriate posture of courts to agency interpretations of statutes would 
continue unabated and unaffected between those who favor strong deference and those who prefer 
weak deference to the executive. These concern the application of the two-step process of Chevron 
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), where it was determined that the 
government’s interpretive action had the force of law. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 
229 (2001) (applying the two-step process outlined in Chevron to hold that the United States Customs 
Agency was not entitled deference in determining a tariff classification). 
304. Some commentators have suggested judicial review of agency action should be more 
accommodating of political considerations. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics 
in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2009) (“[W]hat count as ‘valid’ reasons 
under arbitrary and capricious review should be expanded to include certain political influences from 
the President, other executive officials, and members of Congress, so long as the political influences 
are openly and transparently disclosed in the agency’s rulemaking record.”). For the reasons developed 
in Part III, I am skeptical this would be wise in the counterterrorism domain.  
305. 553 U.S. 674 (2008). 
306. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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that turns on the facts of the particular case. Abandoning the Separation of 
Powers as a heuristic, in short, would sometimes favor the executive and 
sometimes would cut against claims of government power. Issues of statutory 
interpretation and individual rights, however, would turn on the application of 
traditional judicial tools, not claims of comparative institutional competence 
that are conjured, spirit-like, from the texts of the Founders. 
Whatever its ultimate ideological valence on the ground, the argument 
developed in this Article would remove a series of imprecise and misleading 
generalizations from the judge’s tool kit in counterterrorism cases. As a result 
of such a change, judicial examination of counterterrorism policies for statutory 
conflicts or violations of individual rights would start to look much more like 
judicial regulation of other policy areas than it currently does. Judges would 
need to pay the same attention to factual predicates and specific details about 
policies as they do in cases involving campaign finance, affirmative action, or 
telecommunications policy. This means that judges must resolve specific 
questions of fact raised by the application of a policy to particular plaintiffs or 
defendants. 
How would judges fare in this enterprise? Experience suggests that federal 
judges are capable of making granular empirical judgments in the national 
security context despite secrecy concerns.307 Federal judges have long 
employed tools such as in camera, ex parte examinations,308 as well as the 
established statutory instruments employed now to handle classified evidence 
in criminal cases without compromising national security.309 In some domains 
of constitutional law, there is reason to believe courts are legally compelled to 
make fine-grained empirical judgments.310 As to the success rate of judicial 
handling of factual questions in this context, a recent review of the courts’ 
treatment of “national security fact[s]” plausibly rejects a “one-size-fits-all 
solution” to the problem.311 That analysis contends that judges should “account 
separately for the possibility that the executive has superior access to 
information and to expertise, and should require a showing that the executive 
307. But see John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
427, 431 (2003) (arguing against judicial involvement in national security cases in abstract terms). 
308. See, e.g., United States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538, 546 (E.D. Va. 2006) (using in 
camera, ex parte review of evidence behind a surveillance warrant in order to ascertain whether 
defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights had been violated); see also United States v. Hammoud, 381 
F.3d 316, 332 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (endorsing same procedure and also reviewing the evidence de 
novo); United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting Confrontation Clause 
challenge to this kind of procedure).  
309. See Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16 (2006); United 
States v. Lee, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1325–26 (D.N.M. 2000) (describing statute’s operation). 
310. This is particularly the case in the First Amendment domain. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958). 
311. Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1435 
(2009).  
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actually and reliably exploited such advantages.”312 That is, much as in other 
fields, record evidence of demonstrated expertise by the government in the case 
at bar would be accounted for and rewarded in the court’s reasoning. Put to the 
proof, the analysis in Part II suggests that the executive may well be found 
wanting in a nontrivial number of occasions. In those cases, litigation of factual 
questions should proceed in the same way it would in any other policy 
domain—resting upon the facts and upon specific showings or expertise or 
epistemic advantage. By contrast, where the government or Congress has 
exercised their considerable investigative and analytic authorities in a 
meaningful way, there is no reason to ignore the fruits of that labor. 
It is not simply that there is no reason to presume ordinary tools of 
statutory interpretation and fact finding will go awry more often in 
counterterrorism than in any other policy domain. There is some ground to 
believe that federal judges (to the extent they are willing to take up the role313) 
are capable of reaching more or less reliable outcomes. As a consequence of 
Article III, federal courts typically intervene in controversies after the fact, or at 
least after some facts have become available. Thus, they benefit from a more 
developed empirical record than legislators and executive officials. Courts also 
gain from the adversarial process, in which both the government and those 
directly affected by a policy have an opportunity to present evidence of the 
justifications and costs of a policy. That adversarial presentation, in addition, 
presents a possible opportunity to cure potential hindsight bias. 
Compounding the courts’ timing-related advantages, there is a familiar 
point about relative political insulation. On the one hand, there is much reason 
to fear that external political pressures will lead the political branches to leave 
uncorrected gross errors by elected leaders and instead to target out-groups for 
particularly harsh or intrusive treatment. By contrast, it is plausible to think that 
federal judges are constrained, at least on the margin, by strong disciplinary 
norms of legal craftsmanship and fidelity to precedent, not to mention the 
obligation to supply reasons.314 Moreover, to the extent that critics of judicial 
review more generally worry about the possible downstream costs of errors by 
courts, it is worth recalling that Congress has proved itself quite capable of 
intervening after a judicial decision, even on constitutional grounds, to rectify 
312. Id. at 1365. In his rich analysis, Professor Chesney concludes that judges “should require a 
showing that the executive actually and reliably exploited [epistemic or expertise] advantages.” Id. To 
the extent this entails case-by-case judgments of specific claims, rather than any blanket approach to 
categories of cases, I am in accord with Professor Chesney’s analysis.  
313. Over time, presidents might stock the bench with judges committed on ideological 
grounds against fulfilling this role—a risk in any politically appointed judiciary.  
314. For a cogent statement of this basic fact from a prominent jurist, see Richard A. Posner, 
What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everyone Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 1, 28 (1993) (“The pleasure of judging is bound up with compliance with certain self-limiting 
rules that define the ‘game’ of judging.”).  
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perceived errors.315 In sum, without being too dewy-eyed about the judiciary—
which is surely also a flawed institution amenable to criticism for its biases and 
ingrained habits—there is no reason to think that a process involving the 
political branches alone will necessarily yield better results than a process that 
begins in the political branches but that is also characterized by a public airing 
through serious judicial review unhindered by structural constitutional 
presumptions. 
CONCLUSION 
The Separation of Powers has loomed large as a resolving optic for 
judicial and scholarly thinking about new terrorism-related policies. The wide 
shadow cast by structural constitutionalism sets litigation about 
counterterrorism policies apart from case law arising from other policy areas. 
Scholarship in the field runs along parallel tracks. I have aimed to show in this 
Article that structural constitutional presumptions provide only shaky guidance 
in the counterterrorism domain. The internal structure and external political 
ecology of the political branches in tandem render such presumptions highly 
unreliable proxies to judge the wisdom of specific policies. The analysis 
developed here cashes out in terms of a call for a different judicial approach to 
counterterrorism cases. To return to the hypothetical with which I began, a 
judge faced with a moratorium on social messaging services should not ask 
which branch made the shut-off decision; she should instead look directly to the 
factual and legal merits of the decision without structural constitutional 
blinders, informed by government lawyers and private litigants who could no 
longer lazily lean on The Federalist and other lawyerly forms of structural 
constitutional folk wisdom. 
The lesson here has a more general implication. A decade after 9/11, 
terrorism is but one of many public policy challenges facing the nation. Its 
shadow will not recede soon, even with the death of Osama bin Laden. Just as 
the government and the public must learn to accommodate and integrate that 
uncomfortable fact into their daily routines and labors, so too must the 
judiciary. The jurisprudence of counterterrorism should cease to be an 
extraordinary exercise in as-applied structural constitutionalism. It must 
become just another part of the ordinary business of the federal courts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
315. See supra notes 170–179 and accompanying text.  
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